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Abstract 
 Static memory analysis has been proven a valuable technique for digital forensics.  
However, the memory capture technique impacts the system by modifying important 
dynamic system data, such as logged on users, network status, active processes, active 
drivers, open files and open registry keys.  As a result, live analysis techniques have 
emerged to complement static analysis.  In this paper, a compiled memory analysis tool 
for virtualization (CMAT-V) is presented as a virtual machine introspection (VMI) utility 
to conduct live analysis during cyber attacks.  CMAT-V leverages static memory dump 
analysis techniques to provide live system state awareness, which includes dynamic 
system data.  Live analysis means that CMAT-V can continually parse live dynamic 
memory from an active guest operating system (OS). Unlike some VMI applications, 
CMAT-V bridges the semantic gap using derivation techniques.  The semantic gap refers 
to the disconnect between raw data from dynamic memory and the OS-specific 
contextual meaning.  CMAT-V detects Windows-based operating systems and uses the 
Microsoft Symbol Server to provide this context to the user.  This technique provides 
increased CMAT-V compatibility for current and future Windows-based operating 
systems.   
 This research demonstrates the usefulness of CMAT-V as a situational awareness 
tool during cyber attacks, tests the detection of CMAT-V from the guest system level and 
measures its impact on host performance.  During experimental testing, live system state 
information was successfully extracted from two simultaneously executing virtual 
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machines (VM’s) under four rootkit-based malware attack scenarios. For each malware 
attack scenario, CMAT-V was able to provide evidence of the attack.  Furthermore, data 
from CMAT-V detection testing did not confirm detection of the presence of CMAT-V’s 
live memory analysis from the VM itself.  This supports the conclusion that CMAT-V 
does not create uniquely identifiable interference in the VM itself.  Finally, three different 
benchmark tests reveal an 8% to 12% decrease in the host VM performance while 
CMAT-V is executing. 
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CYBER-SITUATIONAL AWARENESS USING LIVE  
HYPERVISOR-BASED VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 From the dawn of military aviation, strategic positions in air and space have been 
leveraged for reconnaissance purposes.  Whether obtained by hot air balloons or 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), timely and trustworthy intelligence remains 
paramount to execute strategic military operations.  With the emergence of the 
cyberspace domain, such a privileged position is equally critical.  General Robert Kehler, 
Commander Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) highlights the “move from situational 
awareness to situational comprehension” in cyberspace as a primary military objective 
[Keh09].  Strategies outlined to accomplish this are to “fuse cyber intelligence to deliver 
proactive, responsive operational cyber capabilities” and “develop, refine and apply data 
mining and visualization technologies” in the cyber fight [Keh09].  In addition, the Air 
Force Research Laboratory has identified the need to “detect and defeat threats through 
active defenses” as a focused long term challenge (FLTC) [Tur08].  As cutting edge 
virtualization technology continues to be utilized for military and commercial use, the 
hypervisor provides this trusted higher-ground to obtain cyber situational awareness. 
 Desktop and server virtualization has emerged as an efficient and cost effective 
alternative to traditional “one-box-per-user” systems for a given set of physical hardware.  
In addition, new microprocessor architectures have emerged that are specifically 
designed to support virtualization.  Due to the hypervisors privileged view of the state of 
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its virtual machines (VMs), virtualization has been utilized as an effective environment 
for forensic analysis and intrusion detection systems.  The virtual machine manager 
(VMM) located in the hypervisor provides a trusted view of system.  As such, virtual 
machine introspection (VMI) utilities have been developed to collect and analyze VM 
state information.  Because VMs are abstracted from the VMM itself, the hypervisor can 
collect raw memory data from the VM.  A VMI utility must also provide or derive VM 
specific context in order to extract useful system state information [Hay08].  By 
leveraging this information, network operators can quickly detect and engage cyber 
threats. 
1.1. Goals 
 The goal of this research is to investigate the feasibility of live VMI analysis and 
its effectiveness to provide a multidimensional view of the live system state.  The tasks to 
accomplish this are divided into the categories of software development and performance 
testing.  
Software Development 
• Create a prototype VMI tool that will access live VM memory, detect the OS 
executing in the VM and extract system state information. This research covers 
new ground in VMI research by using innovative techniques to analyze dynamic 
VM memory in real time.  The VMI prototype must be capable of extracting and 
interpreting system state data without pausing the VM itself.  Not only this, but 
information about the OS running on the VM must not be explicitly provided to 
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the VMI utility.  Instead, this information must be passively detected.  Success is 
evaluated by the ability to engineer software that meets these conditions. 
Performance Testing 
• Verify the dependability of live VM analysis while under cyber attack.  For a 
prototype VMI utility to be useful for network defense, it must be reliable while 
the VM is under attack.  The VMI program must present the user with relevant 
and trustworthy information so that the health of the system can be determined.  
For example, the prototype might be able to show the active process list of a 
healthy system, but what if the VM is executing malicious software designed 
specifically to evade detection? Furthermore, the methods used by malware to 
hide its presence on the target system are numerous and are only limited by the 
imagination of the attacker.  To prove the dependability of the VMI utility, it must 
show that it is capable of successfully providing evidence of several different 
types of malware. 
• Verify the ability to conduct live analysis on two simultaneously executing VMs. 
When using virtualization, it is desirable to run multiple VMs supported by the 
same hypervisor. As such, using the VMI prototype, two different VMs executing 
simultaneously must be analyzed to show that the prototype is not limited to one 
VM, but can support multiple active VMs. 
• Evaluate the detectability of VM memory latency caused by live analysis. The 
VMI prototype must also scan and analyze the VM’s dynamic memory without 
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the VM noticing unique changes in performance.  If malware executing in the VM 
is able to detect the VMI sensor, it can react and cause additional damage to the 
system. This goal uses selected benchmarks to objectively evaluate whether or not 
the VMI prototype’s live analysis causes detectable memory latency noticeable 
from the VM. 
• Measure the system resource overhead of the VMI utility on the host.  This goal 
addresses the impact of CMAT-V to the hypervisor itself.  A VMI utility must not 
excessively drain system resources such that the supported VMs cannot operate 
effectively.  Running the VMI prototype likely results in longer CPU times and 
increased memory access time. These values must be quantified.  Benchmarks are 
used while the VMI prototype is not executing and then while under the stress of 
the VMI prototype.  The difference between these benchmark results is compared 
to quantify the change in performance.  This information allows the user to know 
precisely what the impact the utility will have on the hypervisor.   
1.2. Assumptions 
 This research is be conducted under several assumptions.  First, for accurate VM 
analysis, the state of the VMM itself must be trustworthy.  The VMM itself is assumed to 
be uncompromised throughout the experiment.  As such, it is assumed that complete VM-
to-VMM isolation exists.  This also means that the VM cannot detect when the VMI 
application is in use.  Second, Windows is the only VM operating system tested during 
this research effort.  The United States Air Force (USAF) has entered a license agreement 
with Microsoft to make Microsoft Windows part of the USAF Standard Desktop 
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Configuration [Lan10].  This leads to the third assumption that the OS follows the 
software architecture and data structure format as defined by Microsoft.  Once the 
Windows version is detected, the VMI test bed automatically looks up guest OS semantic 
information by accessing Microsoft’s symbol server.  The VMI application uses 
techniques that leverage known OS data structures.  For example, the EPROCESS linked 
list structure tracks active processes on the system [Rus09]. 
1.3. Thesis Overview 
 This chapter presents an introduction to the research effort.  The introduction 
includes motivation, goals and assumptions made.   
 Chapter 2 provides background information on virtualization, virtual machine 
introspection and related work in the area of VMI development.  First the foundational 
concepts behind virtualization are described and the differences between virtualization 
implementations are highlighted.  Then, the motivation for VMI is presented.  A formal 
model that characterizes VMI approaches is also discussed.  Finally, using elements from 
the formal model, an overview of several existing VMI applications is presented. 
 Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology.  First the problem definition 
is stated.  The next section outlines the approach used for VMI tool development.  The 
last section describes the experimental design used to test the tool’s effectiveness for 
threat awareness as well as its system performance. 
 Chapter 4 presents the results of all experiments.  This section includes all 
statistical analysis and describes the meaning of the results. 
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 Chapter 5 contains a summary of the results, conclusions made from the study as 
well as recommendations for future work.  
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II. Background 
 The following sections give an overview of fundamental concepts related to 
virtualization and virtual machine introspection (VMI).  Section 2.1 describes the concept 
of virtualization and highlights the differences between virtualization methods.  In 
Section 2.2, the motivation for VMI is presented along with a formal model for 
characterizing VMI techniques.  Finally, Section 2.3 presents an overview of several 
different VMI applications. 
2.1. Virtualization 
 Virtualization is a technique in which hardware resources of a physical host 
computer are shared to allow multiple guest operating systems (OSs) to run on a single 
host machine.  A general overview of a virtualized architecture is shown in Figure 1. 
 
   
Figure 1.  Virtualization Architecture. 
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 Guest operating systems, known as virtual machines (VMs), run independently 
from one another, completely unaware that other VMs exist.  Hardware resources are 
controlled by a hypervisor which interfaces between the physical hardware layer and 
guest VMs.  The hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM), abstracts the physical 
hardware layer into virtualized hardware for VM use.  The VM operates as if it is using 
physical hardware, unaware of the abstraction that has taken place.  The hypervisor 
allocates either exclusive or shared host resources to the VM.  Exclusive resources are 
used because either the virtualization technology doesn’t allow sharing or the particular 
application requires dedicated resources for certain VMs.  Whether resources are 
exclusive or shared however, the number of ported VMs allowed on a particular system is 
limited to the physical hardware resources of the host computer.  The minimum 
requirements for a particular VM are dictated by the OS distribution and the 
virtualization method used.  At any time, the state of a VM can be saved to an image file 
which can be quickly restored on the same machine or can be ported to other host 
machines [Mat08][Gol08]. 
 Virtualization is not a new concept.  In fact, operating systems have been using 
virtualization for quite some time, allowing the applications executing in the operating 
system to simultaneously access and share hardware resources.  In past implementations 
however, hypervisors constrained users to a particular operating system which further 
limited the system to only OS compatible applications.  Current virtualization methods 
more efficiently utilize the x86 protection ring architecture to allow different operating 
systems to utilize system resources [Mat08][Gol08]. 
9 
 
2.1.1. Protection Ring Architecture 
 The x86 architecture contains four privilege levels that allow regulated access to a 
system’s hardware resources.  These privilege levels, as shown in Figure 2, are referred 
to as rings and range from ring 0 (most privileged) to ring 3 (least privileged) 
[Int10][Bar03].   
 
 
Figure 2. Ring Protection Levels  
[Int10]. 
  
 A higher level ring (e.g., level 3) must request access to data structures and 
routines from a lower level (e.g., level 0) [Sil10].  The main advantage of this structure is 
its usefulness in debugging software.  Once lower ring level routines have been 
debugged, higher ring levels may reliably use its lower level calls.  Consequently, if an 
error occurs, it can be assumed that the error was caused by the current layer under test.  
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In non-virtualized architectures, critical code modules like the operating system kernel 
typically reside in ring 0.  This layer directly interacts with the hardware on the system.  
With virtualization however, the hypervisor often runs in ring 0 as well.  The interaction 
between the hypervisor and the OS kernel depends on the method of virtualization used.  
The difference between these methods will now be discussed. 
2.1.2. Virtualization Methods 
 The four main virtualization methods in use today are OS virtualization, hardware 
emulation, full virtualization and paravirtualization.  The three main elements that 
differentiate virtualization methods are the location of the virtualization layer, the 
modification required for the guest operating systems and the performance impact of 
virtualization on the system.  The similarities and differences of each method will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
2.1.2.1. OS Virtualization 
 With operating system virtualization, the same OS as the host is installed on top 
of an existing operating system kernel.  These isolated program execution environments 
are referred to as virtual environments (VE).  Similar to a VM, the processes that run in a 
VE are isolated from each other (each having its own IP address, software configurations, 
etc); however, the resources they share are not isolated.  OS virtualization does not use 
the VMM to control use of physical resources.  If one VE decides to take resources for 
itself, it negatively affects the performance of the other VEs.  Each VE is also referred to 
as a container that isolates its operation from the other VEs [Kol06][SWs05]. 
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Figure 3.  Operating System Virtualization  
Adapted from[Gol08]. 
  
 During OS virtualization, the host operating system executes virtualization 
software allowing multiple guest functionality.  As shown in Figure 3, the container 
virtualization layer interacts with the host OS kernel to coordinate between the VEs and 
the underlying hardware.  Each VE must be the same OS as the host; therefore no 
modification is required to the guest OS.   
 The benefit of this method is that it requires the least amount of hypervisor 
overhead to implement due to shared OS processes.  Hypervisor overhead involves using 
system resources like CPU and memory.  Despite the benefit of a thinner hypervisor, the 
VEs are still limited to same OS as the host which makes OS virtualization inflexible.  
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For many users, OS virtualization is insufficient because it cannot support different 
operating systems on the same physical system.  Examples of OS virtualization include: 
OpenVZ [Kol06], Virtuozzo [Par10], Linux VServers [Pot09] and FreeBSD jails [Fre10]. 
2.1.2.2. Hardware Emulation 
 In hardware emulation, as shown in Figure 4, hypervisor emulation software 
creates emulated versions of the underlying physical hardware. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Hardware Emulation 
Adapted from [Gol08]. 
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 This emulated hardware environment acts as a VMM and is compatible with OS 
specific system calls.  When a guest OS makes a system call, the VM interacts only with 
the emulated hardware provided by the hypervisor.  The hypervisor then translates the 
calls from the emulated hardware and sends them to the physical hardware.  This method 
allows the host to support a virtual machine of a foreign computing architecture [Bia06].  
For example, if an Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) microprocessor is used, hardware 
emulation could still support an OS that might require an Intel microprocessor.  As a 
result, hardware emulation offers great OS flexibility.  However, due to the high 
overhead required to translate instructions from different architectures to that of the host, 
this method greatly decreases system performance [Sun10].  For this reason some 
hardware emulation software developers advertize decreased CPU performance ranging 
from 1/500 to 1/15 the speed of the host [Bia06].  Examples of hardware emulation 
include: PearPC [Bia06] and Bochs [Law09]. 
2.1.2.3. Full Virtualization 
 Full virtualization is similar to hardware emulation because it also allows 
different unmodified operating systems to run inside a virtual machine.  With full 
virtualization however, instead of making calls to emulated hardware, the virtual machine 
guests run code directly on the physical hardware used by the host.  Compatibility issues 
between a guest OS and the underlying architecture are handled by the hypervisor using a 
technique called binary translation.  Binary translation is a technique used to intercept 
instructions calls made by an OS for a particular architecture and convert the instructions 
so that they can be recognized by a non-native architecture [Sit93].   
14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Full Virtualization 
Adapted from [Mat08]. 
 
 As shown in Figure 5, rather than emulating the whole hardware architecture, full 
virtualization uses the hypervisor to conduct real time binary translation which makes 
VM instructions compatible with the architecture of the host.  The VMM in this case, still 
regulates which VM’s have access to the host’s resources, but once given access, the 
guest VM’s have direct access to the physical hardware [Mat08][Gol08].   
 As virtualization has become more popular, hardware developers such as Intel and 
AMD have created the Intel VT and AMD-V architectures to better support virtualization 
[Int10][Adv10].  This technology is commonly referred to as hardware assisted 
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virtualization (HAV).  In HAV, new hardware extensions and privilege sublevels are 
introduced to specifically manage VM control.  Utilizing HAV improves binary 
translation performance or removes the need for it altogether [Int10].  Though full 
virtualization requires some overhead for the hypervisor layer controls, it allows VMs to 
run at near-native performance of the host [Sun10].  Examples of full virtualization 
include: VMware Server [VMw10b], ESX Server [VMw10a] and VirtualBox [Sun10]. 
2.1.2.4. Paravirtualization 
 All of the previously discussed virtualization methods required a host operating 
system kernel to execute priority system calls to the hypervisor which translated the calls 
for native hardware compatibility.  Paravirtualization, however, presents a guest OS with 
a modified version of the actual physical hardware that allows VM’s direct access to 
lower level hardware.  Xen, an open source paravirtualization package, allows hypercalls 
to be used rather than typical system calls to access privileged system resources.  This 
allows the same memory to be accessed by two different processes.  Paravirtualization 
also is particularly helpful in sharing information between VMs [Mat08].  
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Figure 6.  Xen Paravirtualization 
Adapted from [Gol08]. 
 
 As shown on the left half of Figure 6, in order for paravirtualization to take place 
each VM OS must be compatible with the architecture of the underlying VMM.  In light 
of this requirement, the OS kernel for each VM must be slightly modified to ensure 
compatibility with the Xen hypervisor.  Though only small changes to the OS kernel are 
necessary, this modification is not possible with closed-source operating systems such as 
Microsoft Windows.  For this reason, Xen also supports full virtualization utilizing HAV 
technology as shown on the right half of Figure 6.  These HAV VMs or hardware virtual 
machines (HVMs) can be built around both open source and closed source operating 
systems [Mat08].   
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 Similar to typical ring protection, Xen paravirtualization utilizes a domain level 
architecture.  The privileged domain (Dom0) is equivalent to ring 0 while user domain 
(DomU) refers to rings 1 through 3.  Similar to previously discussed virtualization 
methods, a Dom0 hypervisor manages resource allocation of the underlying physical 
hardware.  In the case of a Dom0 hypervisor, user level software resides in DomU with 
the operating system kernel in ring 1 and the user applications in ring 3 [Mat08]. 
 In addition, Xen provides a special domain to hold the device drivers for the guest 
VMs.  This domain is called the driver domain.  The purpose of offloading driver 
complexity from Dom0 is to make the system more stable should a driver error occur.  
With this design, the driver can be stopped and restored without crashing the whole 
system. 
 The primary advantages of paravirtualization are its low overhead for the VMM 
layer and high performance due to direct access to the physical hardware.  The main 
disadvantage with paravirtualization is its moderate inflexibility because it requires 
modification to the guest OS source code.  This limitation has been remedied however 
with the introduction of HAV technology.  Examples of paravirtualization software 
include: Xen [Mat08] and User-mode Linux (UML) [Dik10]. 
2.1.3. Benefits of Virtualization 
 There are many potential benefits that come with virtualization.  These benefits 
include but are not limited to increased hardware efficiency, lower network maintenance 
costs, effective malware isolation and a more robust environment for software testing.    
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2.1.3.1. Increased Hardware Efficiency 
 As hardware performance increases according to Moore’s law, computing 
resources are often underutilized [Mat08][Gol08].  Virtualization has recently emerged as 
a solution to this problem.  By allowing several VMs to utilize hardware resources on a 
single machine, virtualization provides network administrators with increased hardware 
efficiency.  This is particularly advantageous as systems now include multiple cores and 
increased RAM sizes.  As a result, fewer physical systems need to be purchased to 
accomplish equivalent tasks.  For example, virtualization has been proposed as a low cost 
solution for creating realistic training environments for cyber security education [Ste09].  
Virtualization allows organizations to leverage existing network PCs rather than upgrade 
to new hardware.   
2.1.3.2. Lower Maintenance Cost 
 Another benefit of virtualization is decreased network maintenance cost.  As the 
number of physical systems decrease, so does the workload for system maintenance 
personnel to replace parts, monitor resource usage, etc.  Virtualization also allows remote 
updating of new software or VM images. 
2.1.3.3. Effective Malware Isolation 
 
 Despite the fact that the security implications of virtualization are highly debated, 
virtualization has been shown to provide some degree security benefits [Mor09].  
Because guest VMs are isolated from the host system, virtualization tools can be used 
against malware attacks to effectively sandbox the compromised VM from the rest of the 
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network.  The compromised VM can be then ported to another host to be analyzed while 
a clean copy of the VM image can then be loaded to restore the system to a safe state.   
2.1.3.4. Robust Software Testing Environment 
 Virtualization provides developers a stable system in which to test new OS 
software.  Because each VM is isolated from the underlying host, an OS experiencing a 
system crash in a VM does not take down the whole system.  Developers can quickly 
restore the VM without having to make a hard reboot of the system. 
2.2. Virtual Machine Introspection 
 Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is defined as “… [An] approach of 
inspecting a virtual machine from the outside for the purpose of analyzing the software 
running inside it” [Gar03].  The following section describes the motivation for VMI, the 
semantic gap challenge between the VM and the VMM, a formal model used to describe 
VMI, methods for VMI detection and finally an overview of the capabilities of existing 
VMI applications. 
2.2.1. Motivation 
 The emergence of VMI is closely coupled to the increased interest in 
virtualization over the last several years.  The idea of live analysis of systems however is 
not a new concept.  The following sections describe some of the limitations of static 
analysis that brought about the need for live analysis techniques. 
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2.2.1.1. Static Analysis 
 Static analysis refers to the traditional approach where a target system is halted so 
that all storage media can be copied and used for forensic analysis.  Over time statistic 
analysis tools such as Encase [Gui10] and FTK [Acc10] have proven their value to locate 
and extract useful information.  Static analysis alone, however, is limited in the 
information provided.  Shutting down the system could cause system updates to install or 
the termination of running applications, both of which significantly affect storage media.  
Similarly, pulling the plug can cause significant data inconsistencies and synchronization 
issues [Hay09].  Halting the target system also results in a loss of all volatile system 
information.  Data such as open ports, active network connections, running programs, 
temporary data, user interaction, encryption keys, RAM and cache are unrecoverable.  If 
the encryption key is lost for protected volumes, recovery techniques must be used which 
are not always successful.  Lastly, the downtime required to analyze the system poses a 
great inconvenience to the user.  These limitations highlight the need to supplement 
traditional static analysis with live analysis techniques [Hay09]. 
2.2.1.2. Live Analysis 
 Nonquiescent or live analysis allows the forensic investigator to interrogate the 
system while it is running.  Live analysis techniques include using installed user level 
applications [Sym10][Sou10][Wir10], using imported utilities (i.e., CD-ROM, USB, etc.) 
[DMZ10], implementing system modifications (i.e., dividing production and security 
processes on different processors) [Wil05] or using additional hardware (i.e., a PCI 
hardware expansion card memory scanner) [Car04].  With these approaches, investigators 
21 
 
have access to both static and dynamic memory as well as information about processes 
currently in execution.  In spite of these benefits however, these non-virtualized live 
analysis methods have several drawbacks.  Live analysis is susceptible to observer effects 
such that any probing done to the system inadvertently changes the state of the system 
itself.  This makes preserving the integrity of the system state while using live analysis 
particularly difficult.  In addition, if the system is compromised, the attackers can modify, 
hide or deny access to system data [Hay09].  However, using VMI for live analysis 
overcomes many of these challenges. 
 VMI inherently provides a more secure environment for live analysis to take place 
by allowing isolation, inspection and interposition [Gar03].  VMs are at a lower privilege 
than the VMM; therefore, the VM is not aware of or given access to the underlying 
hardware that supports its virtual hardware [Hay09].  This makes the VMM a prime 
candidate for system monitoring processes.  The monitoring process is completely 
isolated and therefore is not susceptible to malicious modification.  In addition, the VMM 
has complete access to inspect the state of the VM.  The VMM can acquire the VM’s raw 
state which includes CPU state, all memory, I/O device states and I/O controller states 
[Gar03].  Finally, a VMI-based monitoring system allows a preconfigured VMM to 
interpose on certain virtual machine operations and flag when a VM attempts particular 
actions [Gar03]. 
 Though the privileged level of the VMM allows complete oversight of the VM 
state, knowing where to look within OS specific data structures is not a trivial task and is 
discussed in the following section. 
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2.2.2. The Semantic Gap 
 A well known challenge in VMI research is the lack of specific knowledge of the 
guest VM’s state, commonly referred to as the semantic gap [Che01].  The word semantic 
is defined as, “of or relating to meaning in language” [Mer10].  Because the interface 
between the VMM and the VM is inherently designed to isolate the guest VM, it is 
difficult for the VMM to interpret meaningful state information from raw VM data.  
Semantic information includes but is not limited to hardware architectures, operating 
systems, data structures, running processes, system functions, performance goals and 
security policies.  This semantic information is important for meaningful live analysis of 
VMs.  For example, information obtained by probing VM system memory can be 
complex to interpret without knowledge of the VM’s OS specific architecture.  As a 
result, many VMI applications require a priori semantic information as a road map to 
effectively monitor VM activity.  This approach decreases VMI compatibility however 
because it closely couples the VMM to a specific operating system [Jon08]. 
 Previous work has addressed the need for implicit semantic abstraction for both 
hardware [Bug97][Siv04][Wal02] and software [Pag09][Gar03].   For example, by 
analyzing a VM’s semantic performance at a hardware level, a VMM can reallocate least 
valuable pages in memory leading to more efficient memory utilization [Wal02].  
Similarly, it has been shown that information about a particular OS running on a VM can 
also be extracted [Pag09].  Using known OS data structures, a VMM can detect the 
particular version of an operating system running in a guest VM.  Knowing this, 
investigators can more strategically analyze VM activity.   Specific implementations of 
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VMI methods will be discussed more in following sections, but first a more formal model 
for VMI is discussed to more precisely differentiate these techniques. 
2.2.3. VMI Model 
 In [Pfo09], Pfoh, Schneider and Eckert highlight three main challenges VMI must 
overcome as (1) interpreting binary low-level data that comprise the system state to 
obtain abstract high level state information, (2) identifying the relevant parts of that state 
information and (3) classifying system state.  With these challenges in mind, a formal 
model for VMI is proposed. 
 In the formal VMI model there are several terms used to describe VMI 
characteristics.  First, S is the set of all guest system states where s  S represents a 
particular system state.  Sint is the set of all VM states visible to the guest OS being 
monitored where Sint ⊆ S.  This includes all introspection, like using a kernel debugger, 
which can be conducted inside the VM itself.  Sext represents all possible states visible to 
an external source, like the VMM, where Sext ⊆ S.  In addition, C is defined as the set of 
all possible classifications for a particular scenario.  The ideal goal for a VMI 
implementation is to create some function  f : Sint → C or g : Sext → C that outputs a 
classification for a particular state.  Because the characteristics that qualify as the system 
state are theoretically unbounded, a view must be generated to reduce the scope of the 
data.  A view V ideally contains only data relevant to determining classification.  Vint and 
Vext refer to the set of all possible views constructible from Sint and Sext respectively 
[Pfo09].   
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 The function that takes a state s and outputs a corresponding view v is made 
possible by a view generating function.  This process uses knowledge about the guest 
system hardware and/or software architecture.  A particular virtual hardware architecture 
description is defined as λ, and a guest system software architecture is defined as µ .  
Additionally, a profile p is defined as an aggregation of several consecutive views of a 
system run where P represents the set of all possible profiles.  The aggregation a takes all 
profiles along with the current profile to create a new profile.  The profile is then 
processed by function d to determine the classification of the current state.  The following 
functions are defined formally below [Pfo09].  
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Where fλ,µ
 
describes internal view-generation; gλ,µ
 
describes external view-generation; a 
describes aggregation; d describes classification.    
 The information flow for the VMI model is shown in Figure 7 below.  Using this 
model, unique VMI implementations can be more precisely described.  As such, elements 
from this model will be referenced throughout the remainder of the paper. 
 
 Figure 
2.2.4. VMI View-Generation
 The stage of the VMI model
functions that begin with a state 
semantic gap is bridged, providing the investigator not only with raw data, but 
meaning behind the data.  The following describes three view
differ based on where the view
of semantic information used in the generating function
individually or in combination
2.2.4.1. Out-of-Band Delivery
 The most prevalently 
of-band delivery which uses a priori semantic knowledge about the guest VM 
architecture.  With this advanced knowledge
of-band) to deliver specific 
[Pfo09]. 
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 Implementing out-of-band delivery of VM state information, also referred to as 
explicit information [Jon08], has both advantages and disadvantages.  Because the 
information is gathered by the VMM, the VMI application has an omniscient view of the 
VM state.  Utilizing the VMM maintains isolation from attacks to the VMI itself.  View 
consistency is also maintained by interrogating the VM while it is in a paused state.  The 
main disadvantage of out-of-band delivery is that it inherently relies on semantic 
information about a particular OS architecture.  If the assumptions made about the VM’s 
software architecture change (via patches, updates, etc.) the VMI method is often 
rendered invalid [Pfo09].  Any information gathered with this method would be 
considered nonbinding. This term describes the common occurrence where malware is 
not bound to maintain the semantics implied by the OS symbol information.  When 
considering rootkits for example, “ if the hypervisor uses non-binding information about 
the format or location of kernel data structures, the rootkit may evade detection by adding 
fields to the data structures or moving the data structures to a memory location that is not 
being monitored” [Lit08].  A VMI utility that doesn’t adapt to changes made in OS patch 
updates runs the risk of reporting an invalid view of the system state.  
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2.2.4.2. In-Band Delivery 
 In-band delivery of information originates from the guest VM.  Using inherent OS 
knowledge of software architecture and function, the system state is reported to the 
VMM.  A formal description is shown below [Pfo09]. 
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Though the guest OS has the most accurate semantic information about the software 
architecture, there are several disadvantages to this approach.  First, this method relies 
heavily on the trustworthiness of the VM.  Rootkits, for example, designed to hide 
applications could compromise data reported by the guest OS [Hog06].  This would mean 
that the function   would give an inaccurate view of the system state.  In addition, the 
system cannot be paused which could cause inconsistency issues.  By the time the view 
generation function reports the system state to the user, the VM system state might have 
changed.  Finally, because the view-generating function resides within the VM, the 
function is likely to interfere with the system state itself [Pfo09]. 
 In-band delivery is most commonly used in combination with other methods for 
view comparison.  If two views report differing results, this informs the investigator that 
the VM is possibly compromised. 
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2.2.4.3. Derivation 
 Derivation, also referred to as implicit introspection [Jon08], uses semantic 
hardware architecture information to derive a view of the system state.  This more 
passive approach relies on hardware specific activity such as interrupts, page faults, and 
I/O requests [Wil05].  The derivation method is described formally below [Pfo09]. 
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 Because this method uses semantic information about the system hardware 
architecture this approach overcomes the non-binding nature of the methods discussed 
previously.  In addition, this method reports the true system state even if the guest OS has 
been compromised.  Unless malware alters external interfaces, all running processes must 
function within the bounds of the virtual and physical hardware architecture.  There are 
disadvantages to the derivation approach however.  Interpretation of hardware level 
activity is a more difficult task than analysis at a software level.  Low level activity 
provides little or no context for extract user level intentions.  In light of this, the view 
generated from guest system state information is limited in scope [Jon08][Pfo09]. 
2.2.4.4. Combination 
 As mentioned previously, using a combination of in-band, out-of-band and/or 
derivation methods for view-generation can provide a more complete and accurate view 
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of the system state.  For example cross view validation can be used to determine the 
differences between information reported by the VM and what is gathered by the VMM 
[Wan05].  A summary of the properties for each of these methods is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Comparison of View-Generation Properties 
[Pfo09]. 
 
Property 
Delivery 
Derivation 
in-band out-of-band 
HW Portability   - 
Guest OS Portability - -  
Binding - -  
Isolation from Guest OS -   
Inspection of Suspended VM -   
Full State Visibility -   
 
Though leveraging the strengths of each method discussed can be effective, applying 
multiple approaches will not necessarily produce the desired results.  When selecting or 
combining view generation methods, suitability and unwanted interaction effects must 
also be considered [Pfo09]. 
2.3. Related Work 
 An executive summary of previous work in the area of VMI is shown in Table 2. 
Many VMI systems have been developed for general VM monitoring, intrusion detection 
and event replay.  In the sections to follow, each VMI application is briefly discussed in 
further detail. 
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Table 2.  Executive Summary of Existing VMI Applications. 
 
 
  
Sec. Name VMM(s) Tested
OS(s) 
Tested VMI Pattern Description Limitations Ref.
2.3.1 Introvirt UMLinux Linux In-band
Uses vulnerability-specific 
knowledge to invoke code on 
guest OS for system state 
reporting.
If compromised, VM 
cannot be trusted.
Non-binding.
[Jos05]
2.3.2 Livewire VMWare Linux Out-of-Band
Interperets system state via 
VMM to access VM memory. 
Uses provided OS interface 
library for semantic context. 
Uses hooking for intrusion 
detection.
OS interface library 
must be provided. 
Requires VM 
interference. 
Non-binding.
[Gar03]
2.3.3 XenAccess Xen Windows Linux Out-of-Band
Uses user-provided OS 
semantic info to map VM 
memory.
OS information must be 
provided. Non-binding. [Pay07]
2.3.4 Lares Xen Windows In & Out-of-Band
Uses trampoline in VM to 
intercept events.
VM interference. 
Non-binding. [Pay08]
2.3.5 VIX Xen Linux Out-of-Band Pauses VM, accesses VM 
memory, displays system data.
VM interference. 
Non-binding. [Hay08b]
2.3.6 VMWatcher VMWare, Xen, QEMU, UML
Windows 
Linux Out-of-Band
Accesses VM state using user 
provided OS templates then 
uses COTS anti-malware 
software to make classification.
OS templates must be 
provided. Vulnerable to 
malware that targets 
COTS anti-malware 
software. Non-binding.
[Jia07]
2.3.7 AntFarm Xen, Simics Windows Linux Derivation
Tracks process creation, 
context switches and exits.
No user level context or 
VM-state classification. [Jon06]
2.3.8 LycosID Xen Windows Linux Derivation
Uses Ant Farm data along with 
CPU inflation technique to 
compare the lengths of process 
lists at trusted and non-trusted 
levels.
VM interference. [Jon08]
2.3.9 Manitou Xen Windows Linux Derivation
Assigns, tracks, and revokes 
code execution. Applications 
submit trusted code hashes and 
Manitou and disallows any 
untrusted code execution.
Dependant on hashes 
from applications. [Lit06]
2.3.10 Patagonix Xen Windows Linux Derivation
Identifies covertly executing 
binaries. Administrator provides 
white-list of legitimate binaries 
and Patagonix disallows any 
untrusted code to ececute.
Dependant on trusted 
binaries from 
administrator.
[Lit08]
2.3.11 Revirt UMLinux Linux Derivation Allows VM execution replay by 
creating VM checkpoints.
Requires knowledge of 
VM compromise. Does 
not allow live analysis.
[Dun02]
2.3.12 Wizard Xen Linux Derivation
Implements training period to 
observe interaction between OS 
and VMM. Abnormal kernel 
handler functions are flagged.
Dependant on trustworty 
training period results. 
No user-level context.
[Sri10]
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2.3.1. Introvirt 
 Introvirt  [Jos05] is a VMI system designed to monitor the execution of guest OS 
applications.  The system uses a User Mode Linux VMM to support Linux guest and host 
VMs.  Introvirt uses in-band view generation by executing code that already exists in the 
guest.   
 
Figure 8.  IntroVirt System Structure  
[Jos05]. 
 
An overview of the IntroVirt system architecture is shown in Figure 8.  The system 
leverages specific OS semantic knowledge, including OS vulnerabilities, to determine the 
system state.  This semantic knowledge is referred to as a predicate.  These predicates 
must be provided to Introvirt and are then used to detect the triggering of the 
vulnerability.  During predicate execution, guest specific functions are used to present 
data back to the system.  Classification of the system state can only occur after the 
vulnerability has already been discovered.  With this method however, limitations of in-
band view generation still apply.  Data provided by a compromised guest cannot be 
trusted. 
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2.3.2. Livewire 
 As shown in Figure 9, Livewire [Gar03] uses an out-of-band view generation 
pattern by utilizing an OS interface library containing OS specific semantic information.   
 
Figure 9.  Livewire Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Architecture 
[Gar03]. 
 
Livewire can interpret the state of the VM by using the VMM to access pages from 
physical memory in combination with an OS interface library to provide context.  Using 
VM hooks, the VMI intrusion detection system (IDS) communicates with the VMM to 
send event notification.  The IDS then suspends the VM until given an administrative 
command to continue.  Once the VM state has been retrieved, a policy engine component 
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determines the classification of the VM state.  Livewire uses a VMWare VMM to support 
Linux guest and host VMs. 
2.3.3. XenAccess 
 XenAccess [Pay07] monitors VM operating systems running on Xen 
virtualization software.  XenAccess uses an out-of-bound view generation pattern.  Using 
a priori semantic information about the VM operating system, XenAccess can map 
memory pages from domU to a local address range.  An example of mapping using a 
kernel symbol is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  XenAccess VMI Using a Kernel Symbol 
[Pay07]. 
 
 As shown in step 2 of Figure 
specific kernel symbol information which is used to probe the guest VM
information, XenAccess then enters the VM’s dynamic memory to gather raw system 
state data. In order to gather the raw data
libxenstore libraries which provide functions to interface with the VM itself. 
example, XenAccess uses the 
view the memory of a guest VM
based VMs. 
2.3.4. Lares 
 Lares [Pay08] utilizes the functionality of X
hooking locations to monitor 
generation is implemented for the Lares 
shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11.  High-level View of the Lares Architecture and its Core Components
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10, a file system.map is used which 
, XenAccess uses the Xen’s 
xc_map_foreign_range()function from
.  XenAccess supports VMI for both Linux and Windows 
enAccess along with OS specific 
process creation events.  In-band and out-of
IDS system.  The overall Lares architecture is 
[Pay08]. 
contains OS 
.  Using this 
libxc and 
For 
 libxc to 
-band view 
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Through the use of a trampoline in the guest VM, the security VM intercepts events.  
This feature signifies an in-band technique.  The security VM which is external to the 
guest VM then uses matching algorithms and heuristics to actively process the event. 
This feature signifies an out-of-band technique.  Finally, a classification decision is made 
for the event.  Though this is an effective approach it is not free from VM interference.  
The hooks installed in the guest VM inherently modify the VM state. 
2.3.5. VIX 
 Virtual introspection for Xen (VIX) [Hay08] uses an out-of-band view generation 
pattern, where offset values based on the DomU system under examination are initialized 
upon VM creation.  VIX utilizes the Xen Control Library to first pause the VM, access 
and decode memory, then unpause the VM to continue execution.  This procedure is 
demonstrated by the pseudo-code example of the vix-ps utility shown below. 
Pause DomU 
Adr <- Address of Task List Head 
Do 
 Adr <- Adr.next_task_adr 
 Map page(s) for Adr into Dom0 
 Decode task_struct 
 Display data 
 Unmap page(s) with Adr 
While (Adr != Address of Task List Head) 
UnPause DomU 
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This utility lists the current processes being run in the VM.  Using this utility enables 
VIX to conduct cross-view validation to detect basic rootkits.  Though a classification is 
not made about the state of the VM, VIX gives the VMM contextual VM situational 
awareness.  VIX has been shown to operate on Linux based VMs. 
2.3.6. VMWatcher 
 VMWatcher [Jia07] is an IDS that uses an out-of-bounds view generation 
technique called guest view casting.  This technique involves using guest OS semantic 
information as templates to interpret low-level VM states.  The unique feature about 
VMWatcher is that it utilizes off-the-shelf anti-malware software to determine 
classifications on VM states.   
 
Figure 12.  The VMWatcher Approach 
[Jia07]. 
 
 As shown in Figure 12, these anti-malware systems run inside the host OS and in 
the VM itself.  This allows VMWatcher to conduct cross-view validation by comparing 
anti-malware software results from the guest VM and the hypervisor host.  Within the 
VM itself, the anti-malware systems can scan objects such as kernel modules (left circle), 
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processes (middle circle) and files (right). VMWatcher supports VMWare, Xen, QEMU 
and UML virtualization systems.  Though this is an effective approach, this method is 
vulnerable to malware that targets commercially available anti-malware software. 
2.3.7. Ant Farm 
 Antfarm [Jon06] uses a derivation view-generation pattern by observing how a 
guest uses a virtual memory management unit (MMU).  Process creation, context 
switches and exits are monitored by tracking address spaces in which a process event 
occurs.  The process identification techniques used by Antfarm are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Antfarm Process Identification Techniques [Jon06]. 
 
 
 In order to track addresses spaces they are labeled with an address space identifier 
(ASID).  By observing the ASID associated with an event it is possible to identify events 
such as process creation, process exit and context switching.  To assign the ASID for the 
x86 architecture the physical address of the page directory is used; for the SPARC 
architecture, the virtual address space context ID is used.  For each event of interest 
(creation, exit and context switch), Antfarm watches for certain activities to take place. 
These activities differ depending on the architecture used and are shown in Table 3.  By 
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associating the activities with events of interest, Antfarm is able to draw conclusions 
about what how the MMU is being used. 
 Though no classification is made on the VM state, the VMM can extract useful 
system state information.  Because Antfarm does not require explicit information about 
the layout or implementation of memory, the VMI technique is independent of the VM 
operating system.  Antfarm supports Xen and Simics VMM’s and runs Linux or 
Windows as the guest OS. 
2.3.8. LycosID 
 LycosID [Jon08] implements an IDS that uses derivation to obtain guest process 
information.  LycosID leverages Antfarm’s ability to obtain a trusted view of the guest 
operating system then conducts cross-view validation to detect hidden processes.  Finding 
hidden processes involves two steps.  First, the difference H in CPU time observed by the 
VMM and the VM is calculated.  Then a technique called CPU inflation is used that 
inflates the CPU load of a given process.  If H increases as a result of the inflation, it is 
likely that the particular process is being hidden from the VM.  This approach requires 
that the hidden process is not idle.  Though CPU inflation is an effective technique, it is 
intrusive because it modifies the state of the VM itself.   
2.3.9. Manitou 
 Manitou [Lit06] uses derivation at the microprocessor level for intrusion 
detection.  Each new application must submit a signed list of code page hashes through a 
trusted path between the application and Manitou.  A white list is created from the hashes 
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and is maintained by Manitou.  Using semantic information about the underlying 
microprocessor, Manitou monitors each time a program tries to execute code from a 
specific page.  If Manitou has not already marked the page executable, a page fault 
occurs.  The page is then hashed and compared to the white list of allowable hashes.  If 
the hash is found in the list, the code is allowed to execute, if not the unauthorized 
program is terminated.  Manitou has been shown to run with the Xen hypervisor which 
supports Linux or Windows based operating systems [Lit06]. 
2.3.10. Patagonix 
 Patagonix [Lit08], similar to Manitou, uses derivation to look at microprocessor 
events; however, Patagonix focuses primarily on detecting hidden rootkits running in a 
VM.  Figure 13 shows an overview of the Patagonix architecture.   
 
Figure 13.  The Patagonix Architecture. 
 
40 
 
As shown on the right side of the Patagonix VM in Figure 13, Patagonix keeps a white 
list of identity oracles which are created for each type of binary in the monitored VM.    
On the left side of the Patagonix VM, control logic compares executed code to the 
identity oracles and then presents the results with the management console interface 
between the user and Patagonix.  Because Patagonix does not rely on the guest OS, an 
objective list of all running binaries is presented to the user.  With this information, the 
user can kill malicious binaries running on the VM.  There is also a lie-detection mode 
that uses cross-view validation between Patagonix and the VM OS to report hidden 
binaries.  Similar to Manitou, Patagonix uses the Xen VMM and supports Linux and 
Windows based VMs. 
2.3.11. Revirt 
 Revirt [Dun02] is an IDS that uses derivation techniques to enable event replay of 
a VM.  A log is kept of every non-deterministic event that affects a process’s 
communication while the VM is running.  Deterministic events include arithmetic 
computations, memory calculations, branch instructions that will re-execute the same 
way during replay.  Non-deterministic events include the time an event occurred (to log 
interrupts for example) and any external input (such as input from a human).  Revirt is 
designed to run on the UMLinux VMM.  UMLinux uses software to emulate peripherals, 
system calls and interrupts.  By tracking these emulation mechanisms, Revirt is able to 
identify the non-deterministic events.  Periodic checkpoints of the system state are also 
created by suspending the VM.  If an attack occurs, the VM state before, during and after 
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the attack can be restored, replayed and analyzed.  This IDS approach is inherently 
reactionary and requires the administrator to know when the VM has been compromised. 
2.3.12. Wizard 
 Wizard [Sri10] uses a derivation approach to detect kernel attacks.  Developed for 
the Xen VMM, Wizard observes the interaction between the OS and the VMM rather 
than the memory state of the OS itself.  Wizard enters a training period to record and 
characterize requests by applications running on the VM and the calls to the kernel.  After 
the training period, Wizard checks for anomalies in the behavior of kernel handler 
functions.  An example of the differences in normal and abnormal behavior is shown in 
Figures 14 and 15. 
 
Figure 14.  Normal Behaviors for read Kernel Service Handler [Sri10]. 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Abnormal Behaviors for read Kernel Service Handler [Sri10]. 
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 In Figure 14, each line shows the call sequence behaviors learned during the 
training period for the read system call executed when typing on the keyboard.  Each 
call includes the system call with their parameter values and the associated interrupt 
handler.  Figure 15 shows the behavior observed after the LVTES keylogger is installed.  
The lines in boldface indicate those behaviors that do not correlate.  These abnormal 
behaviors can then be further investigated to determine if malware is present.   
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III. Methodology 
 The following sections detail the development of a compiled memory analysis 
tool for virtualization (CMAT-V) and the experimental methodology used during the 
research effort.  Section 3.1 states the problem definition.  Section 3.2 outlines the 
software development approach used accomplish the goal of creating a CMAT-V.  Recall 
from Section 1.2 that this goal requires the prototype to access live VM memory, detect 
the OS executing in the VM and extract system state information. Section 3.3 describes 
the experimental design for performance testing. This addresses the goals to test VMI 
cyber threat awareness, demonstrate multiple VM supportability, evaluate live analysis 
detection and measure host system overhead (see Section 1.2). 
3.1. Problem Definition 
 Existing VMI applications are designed to leverage specific activities and 
architectures found in hardware or software to extract dynamic system state information 
about a guest VM.  VMI techniques that target microprocessor-level hardware activities 
are effective at collecting data; however the results they provide are conceptually separate 
from user-level context.  This separation limits the scope of system state information that 
can be derived.  VMI tools that target software characteristics are privy to user-level 
context which allows the tool to provide a more detailed perspective of the system state.  
As a consequence however, many software based VMI tools require a priori OS semantic 
information to effectively extract useful forensic information.  This limits the portability 
of such tools to operating systems of different distributions or versions.  Also, such 
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techniques are often strictly tied to specific data structures in dynamic memory to extract 
information.  This can provide an incomplete view of the system state by limiting the 
range of dynamic memory investigated.  Other techniques have the potential to interfere 
with the state or execution of the VM itself.  This interference could contaminate the VM 
itself or allow the inspection to be detected by the guest.   This research investigates the 
feasibility of developing a non-interfering VMI tool that conducts a complete scan of 
dynamic memory.  In addition, OS detection techniques are applied in an effort to 
objectively extract contextual VM system state information.   
3.2. CMAT-V Software Developmental Approach 
 This section describes the overall software design of CMAT-V, modifications 
required for software integration and modifications to improve live analysis performance. 
3.2.1. Overall Design 
 CMAT-V builds upon CMAT, a compiled memory analysis tool for static 
forensic analysis [Oko10a][Oko10b].  CMAT parses through a memory dump file to 
extract current users, open network ports, active processes, driver information, open files 
and registry keys.   
 Figure 16 shows the CMAT memory analysis process. 
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Figure 16.  CMAT Memory Analysis Process  
Adapted from [Oko10b]. 
 
 First, the addressing mode is detected as well as the location of the kernel page 
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 Finally, with the PDB information acquired, CMAT can extract process, registry 
user and network information. This is accomplished using previously developed 
techniques [Sch06][Dol08].  Schuster describes search patterns that can be used to scan a 
memory dump for process objects.  Once found, these objects reveal active processes 
information [Sch06].  Dolan-Gavitt presents tools that also use a memory dump to locate 
register hives and use cell indices to locate specific key addresses in kernel memory. In 
addition, the Configuration Manager can be located which provides information about 
which keys are being accessed and what processes are accessing them [Dol08].  Using 
these same techniques, the registry can also be searched to find the users logged on to the 
system.  For example, the registry keys located in the Windows registry directory  
\Microsoft\Windows_NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList 
contain information on about all users on the system.  After these final steps, CMAT then 
presents the user with an interactive user interface to review the results.  This process 
forms the foundation of CMAT-V. 
 Rather than use a memory dump file, CMAT-V is a prototype VMI application 
designed to conduct live forensic analysis of Windows-based guest VMs.  Though the 
static analysis techniques used by CMAT are applicable for most virtualization software 
packages, CMAT-V is designed for compatibility with Xen [Mat08] virtualization 
software.  Xen supports both paravirtualization and full virtualization modes.  Because 
CMAT-V targets proprietary Windows-based guests, Xen is run in full virtualization 
mode.  Figure 17 shows the overall CMAT-V architecture. 
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Figure 17.  CMAT-V Architecture. 
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used by VMs and the HM-API is allocated both CPUs.  All Windows-based automatic 
update features, screensavers or any processes that could possibly interrupt the 
experiment are turned off in the VM and HM-API.  Detailed procedures on how to install 
and set up Xen and the Windows XP virtual machines are described in Appendix A; 
instructions for installing CMAT-V are in Appendix B. 
3.2.2. Software Integration 
 In order to create CMAT-V, this research made several enhancements to both 
CMAT and XenAccess. These enhancements are shown in yellow in Figure 18 and are 
further described.   
 
Figure 18.  Enhancements to CMAT and XenAccess. 
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 First, CMAT-V must ensure that all functions do not assume a particular 
Windows distribution.  Therefore, the default XenAccess initialization of a structure 
called xa_instance was modified.  The xa_instance structure contains VM 
specific configuration information like VM number, VM name, size of memory, etc and 
is passed to nearly all XenAccess application programming interface (API) functions.  By 
default, XenAccess uses two important user provided files called System.map (or 
exports file) and xenaccess.conf to initialize the xa_instance structure.  
System.map contains symbol information unique to the target VM.  This requires that 
the user of XenAccess has prior knowledge of this OS semantic information.  In addition, 
they must populate and create the file ahead of time.  The configuration file 
xenaccess.conf includes the location of the System.map file as well as other VM 
specific information such as VM domain name and OS specific offsets.   
 To create CMAT-V, XenAccess was modified by removing the dependence on 
these user provided files.  This involved removing all dependencies on these files in all 
XenAccess source files.  Once this was completed, CMAT was used to derive semantic 
information from the memory itself.  As discussed previously, OS specific symbol 
information is downloaded from the Microsoft Symbol Server.  Care was taken to 
synchronize CMAT and XenAccess such that CMAT would initialize the 
xa_instance structure with all necessary symbol information before XenAccess 
required the use of the structure.  XenAccess function calls that required xa_instance 
were delayed until after CMAT had populated the data structure.  Once all these 
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modifications were accomplished, XenAccess no longer required any user provided 
configuration files. 
 Next, CMAT-V must integrate CMAT with XenAccess and Xen to give  
CMAT-V its ability access the live dynamic memory of a VM instead of a previously 
captured memory dump file.  CMAT-V modifies CMAT so that it can access live VM 
memory by calling the XenAccess function xa_access_pa().  The remainder of this 
section describes this function and how it is used to modify CMAT. 
 Given a physical address, xa_access_pa()memory maps the page of memory 
from the DomU VM that contains that physical address.  The function returns the address 
to the mapped page and a page offset to the desired physical address.  This memory 
mapping process is shown in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19.  XenAccess VM to Physical Memory Mapping. 
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Parameters to xa_access_pa()include the desired physical address and the pre-
initialized xa_instance data structure.  In particular, xa_instance includes a 
value called xc_handle which is used to access Xen’s built in API.  Using this handle, 
the xa_access_pa() function can subsequently call the Xen function 
xc_map_foreign_range() which executes the memory mapping and returns the 
page base address and offset to the desired physical memory location.   
  For live VMI, CMAT is modified to use data returned by 
xa_access_pa()instead of CMAT file pointers that read from a memory dump file 
[Oko10b].  Most of the analysis techniques used by CMAT are built upon the two 
functions fimove() and figetc().  The first function, fimove(), was originally 
designed to move to a particular location in the memory dump file.  The FILE object that 
identifies the stream to the opened memory dump file and the desired physical address 
are passed as parameters to the fimove()function.  Then the file stream pointer is 
moved to the requested location in the file.  Once the file stream pointer is in the desired 
location, the figetc() function is called to grab one byte from the location of the file 
pointer.  Once figetc()is called, it returns an 8 byte unsigned integer and increments 
the file stream pointer point to the next byte in the memory dump file.  This function only 
grabs one byte at a time; therefore if you wanted five bytes for example, you would call 
figetc() five times.  CMAT-V enhances CMAT by modifying these two functions to 
support VM introspection. 
 Similar to a file stream pointer, CMAT-V uses a variable called memory_index 
to keep track of the currently targeted location in physical memory.  When calling the 
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fimove() function, the memory_index is updated to the desired physical address 
location.  After updating the memory_index address variable, figetc() can be 
called in conjunction with xa_access_pa() to access the VM’s dynamic memory.  
In order to do this efficiently however, figetc() is modified to keep track of the last 
mapped page by the xa_access_pa().  When data is requested from a given physical 
address figetc() first checks to see if the address is located within the page that was 
last mapped by the function.  If the address is within the current page, then only the offset 
into the page needs to be changed and no mapping is necessary.  The principle of locality 
dictates there is a high chance that the next memory request will be located close to the 
previously accessed memory.  Using this principle, an algorithm was developed to 
significantly reduce the paging overhead.  Psuedo code for this algorithm is shown 
below. 
if requested physical address is lower than memory_index then 
 if falls below of range of last accessed page then 
  map new page 
 else 
  update offset by subtracting appropriate value 
else 
 if falls above of range of last accessed page then 
  map new page 
 else 
  update offset by adding appropriate value 
 
If the requested physical address is located outside the range of the last mapped page, 
then a new page is mapped.  Once these changes are made, the remaining CMAT 
functions are now fully compatible using live virtual machine memory instead of a 
memory dump file. 
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3.2.3. Registry Search Optimization 
 This research also modified CMAT’s registry search function get_key(). This 
function returns the location of the requested registry key value.  When CMAT searches 
the registry to extract user information, as described previously, it uses a linear search to 
find the key value of interest. This linear search achieves O(n) performance.  During this 
research, it was observed that Windows arranges the registry keys in alphabetical order.  
To leverage this convention, CMAT was modified to use a binary search. Using the 
function strcmp(current_value,target_value) the algorithm was able to 
determine whether the alphabetical value of the string variable target_value, 
containing the key of interest, was greater than, equal to or less than current_value, 
the key value  currently pointed to in the search.  If strcmp returns a negative value, 
then target_value is further down alphabetically; if a positive value then 
target_value is locate earlier alphabetically in the list; if zero then the key has been 
found.  Using this capability, a binary search was implemented. If the value is not found 
(negative or positive return value), then the binary search moves current_value to 
the middle (alphabetically) of the remaining entries to be searched. This is repeated until 
the target_value is found.  CMAT-V’s modified version of CMAT with a binary 
search achieves O(log n) performance which performs better than the previous O(n) 
performance. 
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3.3. Experimental Design 
 The objectives of the following experiments are divided among three tests.  The 
first test, described in Section 3.3.1, evaluates CMAT-V’s ability to provide VM state 
information to detect different malware attacks running in a VM.  The second test, 
described in Section 3.3.2, measures any detectable memory latency within the VM itself 
caused by CMAT-V’s live analysis.  This test also demonstrates CMAT-V’s ability to 
scan two simultaneously executing VMs.  The third test, described in Section 3.3.3, 
measures CMAT-V’s impact on host performance within the Xen’s Dom0  Hypervisor 
Management API.     
3.3.1. Threat Awareness Testing 
 The objective of this test is to evaluate the effectiveness of CMAT-V for 
providing evidence of malware attacks.  With this evidence, network operators can make 
classifications about the state of the system and determine the defensive actions required.   
 
Figure 20.  System Under Test: Malware Attack. 
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The hypothesis for these tests is that CMAT-V can effectively provide evidence of 
malware attacks. An overview of the system under test for is shown in Figure 20. 
 The tested CMAT-V subroutines include functions to load debug data, get active 
user information, load registry and process data, link process data with users and load 
tcpip data.  The left side of Figure 20 shows that the workload to CMAT-V includes 
selected malware attack scenarios.  The malware attacks for this experiment focus on the 
rootkit class of malware because they are known to hide information from the user.  A 
rootkit is “a set of programs and code that allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable 
presence on a computer” [Hog06].  Many rootkits are designed to gain access to 
administrator level privileges without being detected [Sko03].  Once system access is 
attained, payloads can be delivered to the target system.  The right side of Figure 20 
shows that the metric for this test is evidence of the malware presence.  The nature of the 
evidence needed for successful detection is dependent on the type of malware being 
executed on the system.  These malware attack scenarios are later described in detail 
Sections 3.3.1.1 through 3.3.1.4. 
 
Figure 21. VM System Configuration: Malware Attack. 
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 Unless otherwise specified, only one VM is used to represent the system under 
attack.  The VM system configuration for this test is shown in Figure 21 .  CMAT-V is 
used to conduct live analysis on the target virtual machine.  The target virtual machine is 
then subjected to the malware attack and the changes in CMAT-V results are observed.  
During the malware attacks, CMAT-V is run in its default  
-virt_live live analysis mode, which provides the user with interactive menus to 
further analyze the results.   
 For this series of tests, the performance of CMAT-V is evaluated for four 
different malware scenarios.  The names of the malware used for each scenario are FU, 
Hacker Defender, Vanquish and HideProcessHookMDI [Var10b].  These rootkits are 
selected because they are open source and are well documented.  Though malware in the 
“wild” is often unpredictable and its behavior unknown, well-known malware is chosen 
so that their existence can be clearly identified.  Descriptions and implementations of 
each attack are outlined in Sections 3.3.1.1 through 3.3.1.4.  The last entry in the 
description lists the evidence-of-interest to detect the associated attack.  Whether or not 
these elements of the attack are identified by CMAT-V serve as the metric for these tests.  
3.3.1.1. Attack Scenario 1: FU Rootkit [Var10b] 
Malware Description: This is a direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) rootkit.  
DKOM aims to gain kernel level privilege (Ring0) access, then leverage and modify 
known OS specific architectures.  FU.exe gains access to kernel level privilege by 
loading a false driver called msdirectx.sys.  Instructions given via the command line 
to FU.exe are passed to the driver.  With the driver’s escalated privilege level, it is able 
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to print process information, hide processes, list driver information, hide drivers, set user 
security identifier (SID), list available privileges and set privilege levels [Var10b] 
[CAT10] . 
 
Additional Software Used: 
 •   Process Explorer  •   DriverView   •   InstDrv 
These programs are freely available.  See Appendix D for details on obtaining the 
software. 
Attack Scenario Procedure: With this attack scenario, CMAT-V is used to conduct a 
scan of the uncompromised VM.  Then the FU rootkit is installed and used to hide a 
process.  Once the process has been confirmed as hidden from the VM, CMAT-V is 
executed again and the results are analyzed in attempt to find the hidden process. To 
accomplish this, the following procedures are followed: 
1) Open Process Explorer, DriverView and Windows Event Viewer. 
2) Execute a single CMAT-V scan. 
3) Open InstDrv and install the driver msdirectx.sys.   
4) Open up a command prompt and launch regedit.exe 
5) Launch Windows calc.exe. 
6) Launch a command shell. 
7) Use FU to hide calc.exe by process identifier (PID).     >fu.exe -ph <#PID> 
8) Execute another CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan. 
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CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:  
• Evidence of the existence of hidden process.  Success if CMAT-V is able to 
detect the hidden process; failure if hidden process is not found. 
3.3.1.2. Attack Scenario 2: Hacker Defender [Var10b] 
Description: This is a backdoor program that is designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a 
program to gain access to a system.  Hacker Defender rewrites a few memory segments 
in all running processes while maintaining the stability of the system.  Once this is 
accomplished it can hide files, processes, system services, system drivers, registry keys 
and open ports.  The program also installs a hidden backdoor allowing remote 
exploitation [Var10b][CAT10] . 
 
Additional Software Used: 
    •   Process Explorer          •   DriverView          •   NetCat           •  RegScanner 
These programs are freely available.  See Appendix D for details on obtaining the 
software. 
 
Attack Scenario Procedure: The actions of Hacker Defender are controlled by an 
initialization file (ini-file).  The contents of the file used for this scenario is shown below. 
 
[Hidden Table] 
hxdef* 
calc.exe 
 
[Hidden Processes] 
hxdef* 
calc.exe 
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[Root Processes] 
hxdef* 
calc.exe 
 
[Hidden Services] 
HackerDefender* 
 
[Hidden RegKeys] 
HackerDefender100 
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100 
HackerDefenderDrv100 
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100 
[Hidden RegValues]       
[Startup Run] 
[Free Space] 
 
[Hidden Ports] 
TCPI: 100 
TCPO: 100 
UDP: 
 
 
 
 
The [Hidden Table] section hides all files and directories which start with the strings 
listed below it.  Similarly, the [Hidden Processes], [Hidden Services], [Hidden RegKeys], 
[Hidden Ports] sections hide processes, service and driver names, registry keys and ports 
respectively.  [Startup Run] is a list of programs the rootkit will run after startup.  The 
configuration listed hides all processes starting with “hxdef” and those named 
calc.exe.  The service and driver names that start with “HackerDefender” will be 
hidden as well as any registry keys containing HackerDefender100, 
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDER100, HackerDefenderDrv100, or  
LEGACY_HACKERDEFENDERDRV100.  Finally, open connections on port 100 are also 
hidden by the malware.  Under [Hidden Ports], TCPI is for all inbound TCP traffic; 
TCPO is for outbound traffic.  The ini-file must be named hxdef100.ini to use 
hxdef100.exe in default mode.  The VM configuration for this scenario uses two 
VMs as shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Hacker Defender VM Configuration. 
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6) (Target VM) In the command line execute    >hxdef100.exe 
This will load the ini-file hxdef100.ini and execute the pre-configured 
payload. 
7) (Target VM) Verify that calc.exe has disappeared from the Process Explorer list.  
This confirms that the Hacker Defender payload has been executed. 
8) (Attacker VM) Execute the file bdcli100.exe  and follow the on screen 
instructions with the IP address of the target VM, port 100 and the default 
password “hxdef-rulez” to the command line.  This will open up a remote 
command shell.   
9) (Target VM) Use Windows explorer to verify that any files with “hxdef” in the 
name have disappeared.  This might take a few moments or involve refreshing the 
window view to observe their removal. 
10) (Target VM) Use the Windows netstat command to verify that port 100 does 
not show up as an open connection. 
11) (Target VM) Verify with RegScanner that the listed registry keys in the ini-file 
cannot be found. 
12) (HM-API) Execute a second CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan. 
 
CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:  
• Evidence of the existence of hidden processes hxdef100.exe.  Success if 
CMAT-V is able to detect the hidden process; failure if hidden process is not 
found. 
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• Evidence of existence of executable file location for hxdef100.exe.  Success 
if CMAT-V is able to detect the executable; failure if hidden executable is not 
found. 
• Evidence of hidden registry keys as described in the ini-file.  Success if CMAT-V 
is able to detect any of the registry keys; failure if none are found. 
• Evidence of hidden port 100.  Success if CMAT-V is able to detect the open port; 
failure if open port is not detected. 
3.3.1.3. Attack Scenario 3: Vanquish [Var10b] 
Description: This is a DLL-Injection based rootkit designed to hide files, folders, 
registry entries and log passwords.  Vanquish uses two files, a Vanquish Autoloader 
(vanquish.exe) and a Vanquish DLL (vanquish.dll).  Upon execution of 
vanquish.exe, the DLL is injected into running applications.  The DLL then executes 
the exploits to hide any files, folders or registry keys that contain the string “vanquish.” 
In addition, vanquish installs a key logger to record passwords from the user log on 
screen [Var10b][CAT10] . 
 
Additional Software Used: 
 •   None 
 
Attack Scenario Procedure: The installation of this rootkit simply involves starting the 
executable and verifying that the rootkit is active.  This attack scenario only requires the 
use of one VM.  On this VM, the following procedures are completed: 
1) Execute a preliminary CMAT-V scan. 
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2) Execute setup.cmd and follow the on-screen instructions.  These instructions 
will simply have you press any key to install the rootkit and then click Yes when 
the Windows registry editor asks if you want to add to the registry.  Once 
completed, all files that have the string “vanquish” in them will disappear.  This 
confirms that the rootkit is working. 
3) Execute a secondary CMAT-V scan and compare results to first scan. 
 
CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:  
• Evidence of the existence of DLL injection.  Success if CMAT-V is able to detect 
the DLL in any running process; failure if the DLL is not found. 
• Evidence of hidden registry keys.  Success if CMAT-V is able to detect any of the 
registry keys; failure if none are found. 
3.3.1.4. Attack Scenario 4: HideProcessHookMDI [Var10b] 
Description: This is a basic hook of the system service dispatch table (SSDT).  As the 
name suggests, the SSDT is a table used to locate the call address of a particular system 
function in memory.  The hide process rootkit hooks this table by  
replacing the ZwQuerySystemInformation function in the SSDT.  
ZwQuerySystemInformation is used by programs such as Taskmgr.exe to  
get a list of processes executing on the system.  A new function called 
NewZwQuerySystemInformation replaces the original and filters out selected 
processes and adds the running times of the process to the Idle process [Hog06]. 
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Additional Software Used: 
 •   Process Explorer          •   InstDrv              •   Windows Driver Kit (WDK) 
These programs are freely available.  See Appendix D for details on obtaining the 
software. 
 
Attack Scenario Procedure: This attack scenario only requires the use of one VM.  This 
particular test involves building and installing a driver on the target VM system.  First, 
modify the file basic_mdl_flags.c to indicate the process to hide.  Open the source 
file in a C program in a code editor.  At approximately line 142 you will see code that 
looks like the following: 
 
if(0 == memcmp(curr->ProcessName.Buffer, L"_root_", 12)) 
 
By default, the rootkit is programmed to hide processes starting with “_root_” in the 
name.  For this test, the program calc.exe is the target process to hide.  Therefore change 
“_root_” too “calc.exe” as shown: 
 
if(0 == memcmp(curr->ProcessName.Buffer, L"calc.exe", 12)) 
 
After making these changes, save and close the file.  Now the driver must be built.  To do 
this, open a command shell for the WDK checked-build environment.  Change to the 
HideProcessHookMDI directory where the MAKEFILE and SOURCES files are 
contained.  The HideProcessHookMDI must be in a directory that does not contain any 
spaces.  Then type the command “build” in the command line.  This will create the file  
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hideprocess.sys in the sys\i386 folder, which is the rootkit driver to be 
installed.  Once the driver has been built, the following procedures must be completed: 
1) Run the Windows calc.exe program. 
2) Open Process Explorer and verify the presence of calc.exe. 
3) Execute a preliminary CMAT-V scan. 
4) Open InstDriver. 
5) Type the location of the driver hideprocess.sys. 
6) Click install, then click start to start the driver. 
7) Verify in Process Explorer that calc.exe has disappeared.  This indicates that 
the rootkit is has successfully been installed. 
8) Execute a secondary CMAT-V scan. 
 
CMAT-V Evidence-of-interest:  
• Evidence of hidden process calc.exe. Success if CMAT-V is able to detect the 
hidden process; failure if hidden process is not found. 
3.3.2. CMAT-V Detection and Multi-VM Testing 
 The primary objective of this test is to measure the performance impact of the 
DomU guest machine caused by running CMAT-V within the Dom0 HM-API.  In other 
words, this experiment tests the assumption that CMAT-V’s live analysis does not 
interfere by causing unique memory latency within VM itself.  If it does, the presence of 
CMAT-V could be detectable by the VM and any malware executing within it.  In 
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conjunction with interference testing however, this test is also designed to demonstrate 
CMAT-V’s ability to scan two different VMs supported by the same hypervisor. 
 
Figure 23. System Under Test: VM Memory Latency  
and Multi-VM Analysis. 
 
Figure 24. System Configuration: VM Memory Latency  
and Multi-VM Analysis. 
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 Two simultaneously active VMs are used for this test.  An overview of the system 
under test is shown in Figure 23 and the VM system configuration is shown in Figure 24. 
As shown in Figure 23, the system under test for this experiment is a VM called the 
benchmark virtual machine.  As the name suggests, the benchmark VM runs the 
benchmarks during the tests.  The subsystems that make up this system include all Xen-
allocated resources such as CPU, memory and hard disk as well as load balancing 
algorithms used by Xen to manage the use of the VM’s shared resources.  As shown in 
the top of Figure 23, the only system parameter that is varied is the memory analysis 
mode.   The memory analysis modes represent different configurations of CMAT-V live 
analysis.  Figure 24 reveals that these modes are called baseline, direct and indirect. 
These modes are described in more detail in Section 3.3.2.1.  As shown the left side of 
Figure 23, the workload profiles to the target virtual machine include  
CMAT-V as well as two benchmarks programs.  The benchmarks used are FLOATmem 
and INTmem by RAMspeed [Hol02].  These benchmarks were chosen because they are 
open source and are advertised to be highly sensitive to memory latencies [Hol02].  One 
benchmark is used for each test run.  These benchmarks are described in more detail in 
Section 3.3.2.2.  Finally, the right side of Figure 23 shows that the metrics evaluated are 
CMAT-V’s ability to support multi-VM analysis and the data transfer rates reported by 
the RAMspeed benchmarks. 
 The factors under test, shown in Table 4 below, include the RAMspeed 
benchmarks and the memory analysis modes.   
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Table 4.  Factors Under Test for VM Performance Experiment. 
 
Both VMs are installed with Windows XP service pack 3 with all updates installed as of 
6/10/2010.  The benchmark VM and a secondary VM are the only VMs running within 
the Xen hypervisor in addition to the Dom0 management OS.  The VMs are allocated 
with 512 MB RAM and 10 GB hard disk.   
3.3.2.1.  Memory Analysis Modes 
 Recall from Figure 24 that three memory analysis modes used for this test: 
baseline, indirect and direct.  Baseline mode does not execute any memory analysis at all, 
and therefore CMAT-V is not running in the Dom0 HM-API.  As the name suggests, this 
mode is used for baseline measurements.  Indirect mode uses  
CMAT-V to conduct static memory analysis on the secondary VM.  This VM is used to 
simulate the workload of CMAT-V running in Dom0.  This secondary VM does not 
execute any benchmarks.  From the perspective of the benchmark VM, it experiences the 
effects of Xen load balancing from the CMAT-V workload, yet the memory of the 
benchmark VM itself is not being probed.  Direct mode uses CMAT-V to access live VM 
memory on the benchmark VM throughout the execution of the benchmark.  These 
modes require live CMAT-V analysis of two simultaneously running VMs.  As shown in 
the right side of Figure 23, the success of implementing all memory analysis modes is 
RAMspeed Benchmark Memory Analysis Mode
INTmem Baseline
FLOATmem Indirect
Direct
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evaluated as a metric.  This multi-VM capability is implicitly demonstrated by 
accomplishing the procedures for the VM detection testing that follow. 
In direct mode, benchmarks are executed in the benchmark VM (DomU) while 
CMAT-V is simultaneously executed in the HM-API (Dom0).  Because CMAT-V is 
using the Xen hypervisor to access the benchmark VM’s dynamic memory, it is possible 
that the benchmark VM itself could encounter memory latencies as VM applications and 
CMAT-V negotiate with Xen to access the same memory locations.  To evaluate the 
possible impact of CMAT-V to the benchmark VM’s memory access performance, the 
benchmarks chosen specifically exercise the system’s memory read/write functions.  Any 
decrease in benchmark performance observed while in CMAT-V direct mode would 
suggest that CMAT-V is interfering with the VM.  It is hypothesized that due to Xen’s 
abstraction of the guest resources from the host and associated API, this interference will 
not be observed. 
 Memory latency is not the only factor that might decrease benchmark 
performance within the benchmark VM while CMAT-V is running.  A lower benchmark 
data transfer rate due to the Xen hypervisor sharing hardware resources, such as the CPU, 
between DomU and Dom0 processes could be observed as well.  This particular 
slowdown would not be specifically caused by CMAT-V, but would occur for any 
program that is competing for execution time on the same CPU.  Since this test is 
designed to specifically target memory latency, measures must be taken to isolate system 
sensitivity to that caused strictly by CMAT-V’s live VM memory access.  For this reason, 
the indirect mode becomes necessary.  
70 
 
 Recall that indirect mode creates a similar CMAT-V workload to the Xen 
hypervisor as experienced in direct mode, but the benchmark VM is not actively being 
probed by CMAT-V. This means decreased benchmark performance within the 
benchmark VM is strictly caused by Xen’s resource sharing features and not by memory 
latencies caused by CMAT-V. The benchmark performance from CMAT-V indirect and 
direct modes is then compared.  Using these tests, any decreased benchmark performance 
within the benchmark VM specifically caused by CMAT-V accessing its dynamic 
memory can be further isolated.   
In addition, it is important to correctly configure Xen’s CPU management.  Xen 
allocates each VM a certain number of virtual CPUs (VCPUs).  For multi-processor 
systems it is possible to restrict certain VMs to only use certain processors.  The default 
VCPU configuration used for this test is shown below. 
Name      ID VCPUs   CPU State   Time(s)  CPU Affinity 
Domain-0  0     0     0   r--    1836.6  0 
Domain-0  0     1     1   r--     985.3  1 
WINXP_BenchVM 1     0     0   ---       7.8  any cpu 
WINXP_SecondVM 2     0     0   -b-       9.8  any cpu 
 
The host (Domain-0) is allocated two VCPUs and is assigned two processors (0 and 1).  
WINXP_BenchVM and WINXP_SecondVM are configured to allow Xen to allocate any 
available processor.  This configuration is preferable because it is less affected by Xen’s 
load balancing which restricts the performance of VM guests [Mat08].  This restriction is 
necessary to prevent misbehaving guest VMs from consuming too many resources.  For 
this series of tests however, it is important that the VM under test is not significantly 
affected by load balancing.  For this reason, the VMs are configured to use any processor 
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available.  In addition, this default mode is more robust for determining CMAT-V 
detection because it does not assume a specific CPU/VCPU assignment. 
3.3.2.2. RAMspeed Benchmarks 
 This test uses the RAMspeed benchmark suite [Hol02].  RAMspeed is a 
command line benchmark that measures the effective bandwidth of both dynamic cache 
and memory.  In particular, the INTmem and FLOATmem benchmarks are chosen as the 
workloads for this experiment.  Both integer and floating point benchmarks are used to 
represent real life workloads that conduct both integer and float based calculations. 
INTmem Benchmark - This benchmark consists of the following four subtests: copy, 
scale, add and triad.  Copy simply transfers data from one memory location to another (A 
= B).  Scale modifies the value before transferring the data by multiplying the value by a 
constant (A = m*B).  Add reads two memory locations adds them together and stores the 
result into a third location (A = B + C).  Triad merges all three instructions together by 
reading from two memory locations, multiplying one by a constant, adding them together 
and then storing the result (A = m*B +C).  The last result provided by the benchmark is 
an average of the performance of all four subtests.  INTmem uses double (32 bit) words 
and can be configured to transfer a variable amount of data per pass.  The result of this 
benchmark is the data transfer rate in megabytes per second (MB/s). 
FLOATmem Benchmark - Similar to INTmem, FLOATmem executes the copy, scale, 
add and triad subtests.  The last value averages the performance from all four subtests 
together.  Unlike INTmem however, FLOATmem uses quad (128 bit) words.  The result 
of this benchmark is the data transfer rate in megabytes per second (MB/s). 
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 Each benchmark configuration is run 100 times for both direct and indirect 
memory analysis modes.  For both benchmarks, 50 measurements are taken both before 
and after the active CMAT-V measurements, to ensure baseline consistency throughout 
the test.  For example, when running either benchmark the configuration sequence is 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Configuration Sequence for VM Performance Experiment. 
 
 
This results in a total of 350 runs for each benchmark.  There is nothing inherently 
special about choosing 100 runs for the analysis modes and 50 for each baseline.  These 
numbers were selected as starting points because they were hypothesized to be enough 
runs for the data collected to stabilize at a certain range or for any trends to be noticed.  In 
addition, it is advantageous for the number of baseline measurements to meet or exceed 
that of the memory analysis modes because the baseline is used as a standard to compare 
with other results.  Also, by conducting baseline measurements before and after the 
configuration under test, any changes in overall system performance throughout the 
experiment can be observed.  Ultimately, however, the data dictates if more precision 
(and therefore more runs) is necessary.  For example, if the results of the baseline and 
direct/indirect modes are very close together, more runs might be required to increase the 
precision of the test.  For this experiment, these run numbers mentioned are used as an 
Number of Runs Memory Analysis Mode
50 Baseline
100 Indirect
50 Baseline
100 Direct
50 Baseline
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initial starting point for analysis and discretion is used once the data is collected to 
determine whether more runs are necessary. 
 The default data size for each pass of the benchmarks of 8 gigabytes is used for 
each run.  RAMspeed is run using the provided batch mode, which allows repeated runs 
to be executed.  An example command line for the RAMspeed benchmark is shown 
below. 
 
<current_directory>ramspeed-win32 -b 3 -l 100 > data.log 
 
The ‘-b’ indicates the benchmark ID.  In the above example, ID 3 is selected which is the 
INTmem benchmark.  The ‘-l’ indicates that the benchmark will be run in batch mode 
and the example shows this benchmark will run 100 times.  The output from the 
benchmark is then stored in the file data.log. 
 When running the benchmarks, CMAT-V is run continuously by using a bash 
script that repeatedly executes CMAT-V.  An example bash script is shown below. 
 
for(( ; ; )) 
do 
 /xenaccess/examples/cmat -virt_live_bench 1 
done 
 
The -virt_live_bench mode configures CMAT-V to immediately exit after one 
iteration through the program.  Using this bash script, CMAT-V is then immediately 
restarted.   
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 One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests that use student’s t-test are used to 
determine whether there are significant differences in performance between the baselines, 
between the baselines and active CMAT-V modes and between the CMAT-V direct and 
indirect modes.  Real-world user workloads on a given system often vary over time, 
therefore when determining the baseline variation only the average RAMspeed subtest is 
considered.  The averaged data combines the performance of the other four subtests.  The 
variation baseline measurements based on this subtest provides a generalization of overall 
system state variation.  ANOVA tests are conducted using a 95% confidence interval 
assuming normal distributions. 
3.3.3. Host System Performance Testing 
 The objective of these experiments is to measure the host system overhead 
required to run CMAT-V within the Xen’s HM-API.  This test is different from the 
previous test because benchmarks are run in the HM-API rather than a particular VM.  
Because the HM-API has complete access to the hypervisor, the results from these 
benchmarks characterize the performance of all host hypervisor resources, not just those 
allocated to a particular VM. The hypothesis for this series of experiments is that 
executing CMAT-V will have a low to moderate impact (>30% decrease) on host system 
performance using the selected laptop and hardware configuration.  These tests use the 
Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [Pho10] to conduct several Linux-based benchmarks.  
Phoronix was chosen because it is freely available and contains a wide variety of 
benchmark workloads.  Installation procedures for the PTS can be found in Appendix C. 
 An overview of the system under test is shown in Figure 25 
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Figure 25. System Under Test 3: Host Performance. 
 
 The Dom0 HM-API has privilege to use and control all system resources such as 
CPU, memory and hard disk.  This Dom0 OS must also use Xen’s load balancing 
algorithms to share its resources with VMs running on the hypervisor.  Similar to 
previous tests, CMAT-V is a workload to the system under test.  In addition to the 
CMAT-V workload, benchmarks used in this series of tests target memory read/write and 
CPU performance.  The PTS includes Linux-based versions of the RAMspeed 
benchmarks INTmem and FLOATmem described in Section 3.3.2.  As shown in Figure 
25, these benchmarks are used as workloads to the system for testing memory read/write 
performance.  In addition to the RAMspeed benchmarks, the FFmpeg [Var10a] 
benchmark is used as a workload to the system to specifically test CPU performance.   
The metrics for the RAMspeed benchmarks are the same as previous tests. Each 
RAMspeed benchmark reports the data transfer rate for the copy, scale and triad subtests 
as described previously.  For the FFmpeg benchmark however, encoding time is the 
metric observed. The details of this benchmark are described next. 
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FFmpeg - This benchmark uses FFmpeg to test the system’s audio/video encoding 
performance.  FFmpeg converts an audio video interleave (AVI) video file to a National 
Television System Committee (NTSC) video compact disc (VCD) file.  The results for 
this benchmark are reported as an average of no less than three runs and are reported 
seconds to complete the file encoding.  The results of this benchmark are in seconds. 
To install this benchmark in the PTS, the following command must be executed: 
 >phoronix-test-suite install ffmpeg 
 All benchmarks are run within one active Windows XP SP3 VM.  This VM is the 
only VM running within the Xen hypervisor in addition to the HM-API.  The VM is 
allocated with 512 MB RAM and 10 GB hard disk.  If one VM is instantiated, this leaves 
the Dom0 guest 1.45 GB RAM.  The Dom0 HM-API is configured with two VCPUs, one 
assigned to each processor.  The VM is configured to use only one processor but allows 
Xen to select any available processor.  The factors under test are shown in Table 6 below 
and the configuration sequence is shown in Table 7.   
Table 6.  Factors Under Test for System Performance Test. 
 
 
Table 7.  Configuration Sequence for System Performance Test. 
 
RAMspeed Benchmark Memory Analysis Mode
INTmem Baseline
FLOATmem Direct
Ffmpeg
Number of Runs Memory Analysis Mode
50 Baseline
100 Direct
50 Baseline
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 Fifty baseline benchmark measurements run without CMAT-V in execution are 
run before and after each benchmark test as shown in Table 7.  This results in a total of 
200 runs for each benchmark.  Using the same reasoning mentioned in Section 3.3.2, 100 
runs for direct mode and 50 for each baseline mode are used as a starting point and 
discretion is used to determine if more runs are necessary.  The FFmpeg benchmark uses 
the Phoronix batch mode so that the any user prompts are automated.  The batchmode 
setup is run by executing phoronix-test-suite batch-setup indicating not 
to save test results after each run and to run all test options.  After this has been setup, a 
bash script is run to automate execution.  Below is a bash example that runs FFmpeg 
benchmark 100 times. 
for((1;1;100)) 
do 
  /working_directory/phoronix-test-suite/phoronix- 
  test-suite batch-run ffmpeg 
done 
The output from running the bash script is written to a log file.  By conducting baseline 
measurements before and after the configuration under test, any changes in HM-API 
system performance throughout the experiment can be observed.   
 One-way ANOVA tests are used to determine whether there is a significant 
difference in benchmark performance between the baselines as well as between the 
baselines and with CMAT-V in execution.  Similar to the test in Section 3.3.2, real-world 
user workloads on a given system often vary over time, therefore when determining the 
baseline variation only the average RAMspeed subtest is considered.  The averaged data 
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combines the performance of the other four subtests.  The variation baseline 
measurements based on this subtest provides a generalization of overall system state 
variation.  ANOVA tests are conducted using a 95% confidence interval assuming 
normal distributions.  
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IV. Results 
 The following sections detail the results of all experiments.  Section 4.1 describes 
results from the threat awareness tests.  Section 4.2 describes the results from the VM 
performance testing.  Section 4.3 describes the results from the host system performance 
testing.  Section 4.4 summarizes and discusses any general conclusions made from the 
results.   
4.1. Threat Awareness 
 A summary of the results from the threat awareness testing are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8.  Threat Awareness Results. 
 
 For each test a successful result indicates that CMAT-V provided evidence of the 
malware attack.  For those results that were inconclusive, CMAT-V did not confirm nor 
Malware Attack Evidence of Interest Result
FU Hidden Processes Success
Hidden Processes Success
Hidden Files Success
Hidden Registry Keys Inconclusive
Hidden Port Success
DLL injection Success
Hidden Registry Keys Inconclusive
HideProcess Hidden Processes Success
Hacker Defender
Vanquish
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deny the presence of the malware being tested.  These results are described further in 
Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.4 and final conclusions are discussed in Section 4.1.5. 
4.1.1. FU Results 
 The evidence-of-interest for this attack scenario was to determine if CMAT-V 
could detect the process calc.exe after it has been hidden from the target VM.  
CMAT-V was successful in detecting the hidden process.  A screenshot of the process 
detection is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26.  CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for FU Rootkit. 
 
 The right side of Figure 26, shows the active processes reported from the target 
VM via Process Explorer. The left side of Figure 26 shows the active processes reported 
by CMAT-V.  The process calc.exe with the process identifier (PID) of 884 is absent 
from the Process Explorer application.  This process however is captured by CMAT-V, 
as shown by the red box. CMAT-V also reports a “No” result under the InProcList 
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column for calc.exe. This means that CMAT-V has identified this process as 
missing from the Windows executive process (EPROCESS) list.   
4.1.2. Hacker Defender Results 
 The first evidence-of-interest for this attack scenario was the detection of the 
hidden executable hxdef100.exe.  CMAT-V was successful in detecting the hidden 
process.  A screenshot of the process detection is shown in Figure 27.   
 
Figure 27.  CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for Hacker Defender. 
 
Like in Figure 26, the right side of Figure 27 shows the active process list reported by the 
VM (via Windows Task Manager), while the left side shows the same reported by 
CMAT-V.  The PID of the hxdef100.exe process is 1640.  The screenshot shows no 
evidence of hxdef100.exe in the task manager of the target VM;  however, CMAT-V 
was able to detect this process (as shown in the red box). 
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 The second evidence-of-interest was CMAT-V’s ability to detect hidden files on 
the target VM.  Using the CMAT-V interface, the process hxdef100.exe was selected 
and process environment information was requested.  This description includes 
information about the location of the executable, command line arguments used to 
execute, the title of any windows open and the DLL path(s) used by the executable.  The 
process environment information for hxdef100.exe is shown in the bottom half of 
Figure 28.   
 
Figure 28.  CMAT-V Hidden File Detection for Hacker Defender. 
 
The particular information of interest for this test is the location of the executable.  The 
red box in Figure 28 shows that the detected executable originated from the path  
C:\Documents and Settings\ddodge\My Documents\ROOTKITS\hxdef100r\. 
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According to the VM file system however (as shown at the top of Figure 28), this folder 
does not exist.  This successfully demonstrates how CMAT-V can be used to detect files 
and folders hidden from the VM itself. 
 The third evidence-of-interest for this scenario are hidden registry keys used by 
the rootkit.  The only registry information shown by CMAT-V is 
REGISTRY/MACHINE/ which only indicates the root-level registry key.  Due to the 
large number of registry keys and values, CMAT-V is not currently designed to search 
for and display all registry keys for each process.  In light of this, the presence of the 
malware cannot be confirmed or denied by observing the registry information provided 
by CMAT-V. 
 
 
Figure 29.  CMAT-V Hidden Port Detection for Hacker Defender. 
 
The final desired piece of evidence is the presence of the open port 100.  A screenshot of 
the results is shown in Figure 29.  As shown at the top half of Figure 29 the VM 
netstat command reports no open connections; however, CMAT-V accurately detects 
84 
 
a connection at port 100 for the NetCat process nc.exe (shown in the red box).  
Though the port connection is detected, the local and remote internet protocol (IP) 
address information is not presented.  For user datagram protocol (UDP) connections 
both the local and remote addresses are detectable by CMAT-V.  For transmission control 
protocol (TCP) connections however, CMAT-V is currently unable to retrieve IP address 
information and is described as a focus for future development in Chapter 5.  Currently, 
for both TCP and UDP, CMAT-V provides evidence of an open port hidden from the VM 
guest.  In doing so, CMAT-V provides user information to guide further investigation on 
the guest machine.   
4.1.3. Vanquish Results 
 The attack scenario that includes the Vanquish rootkit first tests CMAT-V’s 
ability to provide evidence of DLL injection and hidden registry keys.   
 
Figure 30.  CMAT-V DLL Injection Detection for Vanquish. 
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For this test, the user-owned process explorer.exe is selected.  For each process, 
CMAT-V provides a list of all currently used DLLs. The Vanquish rootkit injects its DLL 
into every user-owned process.  As shown in the red box of Figure 30, VANQUISH.DLL 
is detected by CMAT-V.  This demonstrates CMAT-V’s ability to provide 
uncompromised evidence of DLL injection on the guest system. 
 The second test investigated CMAT-V’s ability to reveal hidden registry keys.  
Similar to the test in Section 4.1.2, CMAT-V was only able to provide root-level 
descriptions of the registries used by a process.  Consequently, the presence of the 
Vanquish rootkit can be neither confirmed nor denied with this information. 
4.1.4. HideProcess Results 
 The final attack scenario uses the HideProcess rootkit which tests CMAT-V’s 
ability to detect a process when hidden using a modified SSDT.   
 
Figure 31.  CMAT-V Hidden Process Detection for HideProcess. 
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 The results of this test are shown in Figure 31.  The rootkit is used to hide the 
process calc.exe.  As shown in on the right in Figure 31, the task manager by the 
guest VM does not report the existence of the process calc.exe.  The left side of 
Figure 31, however, shows that CMAT-V is able to detect this hidden process with a PID 
of 3816.  For this case, CMAT-V reports a “Yes” in the InProcList column which 
signifies that calc.exe is still contained within the VM’s EPROCESS list.  This is 
consistent with the behavior of HideProcess, as it does not remove targeted processes 
from the list but rather filters them out when the list is queried.   
4.1.5. Conclusion 
 For all of the attack scenarios conducted, CMAT-V was able to provide 
uncompromised system state information to allow successful malware detection.  Of each 
evidence-of-interest type, most were demonstrated as successfully detected by CMAT-V.  
The registry key detection was the only inconclusive evidence provided by CMAT-V and 
future work to improve this capability is discussed in Chapter 5.  It is important to note 
that CMAT-V is currently designed for VM state view-generation only, providing only 
evidence of the system state.  CMAT-V does not make claims about the classification of 
the VM state itself.  In order for a classification to be made about whether the VM guest 
is safe or compromised, VM guest requires user interpretation of the results provided. 
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4.2. CMAT-V Detection and Multi-VM Testing 
 This section contains the results from the VM performance tests to measure the 
performance impact to the DomU guest machine caused by running CMAT-V within the 
Dom0 HM-API.  In addition, CMAT-V’s multi-VM analysis is demonstrated.  Sections 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 describe the results from the INTmem and FLOATmem benchmarks 
respectively.  Section 4.2.3 contains concluding remarks based on the benchmark results 
and multi-VM analysis. 
4.2.1. INTmem Benchmark 
 The first step in analyzing the performance of the INTmem benchmark is to 
ensure that the data collected reflects normal system behavior.  Any uncharacteristic 
behavior must be identified and handled accordingly.  The scatter plot in Figure 32 shows 
the behavior of the INTmem benchmark for the sequential 350 runs.   
 
Figure 32.  Scatter Plot of VM INTmem Average Performance. 
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The data shown is the average of the four tests copy, add, scale and triad for each run.  
These results show that the first several runs of each set encounter distinctively high data 
transfer rates.  After this initial period, the performance appears to stabilize at a lower 
range for the remaining runs.  This initial spike in performance could likely be caused by 
the time delay for the Xen load balancing routines to evaluate and balance the workload.  
These initial runs appear abnormal compared to subsequent runs.  The data collected 
while the performance is stabilized best represents normal program performance.  As a 
result, the first 10 runs from each set of runs are not considered. 
 Recall from Section 3.3.2 that baseline mode does not execute any memory 
analysis at all, and therefore CMAT-V is not running in the Dom0 HM-API.  In direct 
mode, benchmarks are executed in the benchmark VM while CMAT-V is simultaneously 
probes the VM from the HM-API.  Indirect mode creates a similar CMAT-V workload to 
the Xen hypervisor as experienced in direct mode, but the benchmark VM is not actively 
being probed by CMAT-V. This means decreased benchmark performance within the 
benchmark VM is strictly caused by Xen’s resource sharing features and not by memory 
latencies caused by CMAT-V. 
 With these memory analysis modes in mind, next step is to compare the baseline 
performance sets to determine if any factors affect the system state over time.  A baseline 
is run before the indirect mode testing, between tests and after the direct mode testing.  If 
any significant increases or decreases in baseline performance over time exist compared 
to the modes under test, the effects of the variations must be taken into account.  ANOVA 
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statistics and box plot of the three baselines are shown in Table 9 and Figure 33 
respectively. 
Table 9.  ANOVA Results for VM INTmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 
Figure 33.  Box Plot of VM INTmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 The ANOVA results in Table 9 show that the P-value over a 95% confidence 
interval is zero when each of the baselines is compared.  The hypothesis being tested is 
that the difference between each sample sets is zero (the sample means are not 
statistically different). Considering the data collected, the P-value reveals that the 
probability of this being true is 0%.  In other words, the results obtained support the 
Baseline Test 1 2 3 1 = Before Indirect Test
Mean 2684.48 2676.59 2681.9 2 = Intermediate
StDev 7 8.02 9.17 3 = After Direct Test
Tests Compared 1-2 1-3 2-3
P-Value [Diff = 0] 0 0 0
Est. Difference 
[First - Second] 7.89 2.58 -5.31
Percent Change 0.29% 0.10% -0.20%
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conclusion that the baselines measured are statistically different.  As shown in the box 
plot in Figure 33, it is possible that over time there could be a slight linear decrease in 
performance over time, but this is ultimately inconclusive. A more precise 
characterization of the performance trend over time would require further testing which is 
out of the scope of this study.  However, the data collected does provide valuable 
information about the magnitude of the change in system behavior over the course of the 
experiment.  As shown in the second-to-last row in Table 9, the estimate in magnitude of 
the difference between each baseline ranges from 2.58-7.89 MB/s.  Because these 
baseline measurements are combined for later analysis, once final results are obtained 
these variations in performance must be taken into consideration when drawing 
conclusions about the data. 
 
 
Figure 34.  Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on VM INTmem Performance. 
A
V
ER
A
GE
TR
IA
D
A
DD
SC
A
LE
CO
PY
Di
re
ct
In
di
re
ct
Ba
se
lin
e
Di
re
ct
In
di
re
ct
Ba
se
lin
e
Di
re
ct
In
di
re
ct
Ba
se
lin
e
Di
re
ct
In
di
re
ct
Ba
se
lin
e
Di
re
ct
In
di
re
ct
Ba
se
lin
e
2900
2800
2700
2600
2500
2400
2300
D
a
ta
 T
ra
n
s
fe
r 
R
a
te
 (
M
B
/
s
)
91 
 
Table 10.  ANOVA of CMAT-V Impact on VM INTmem Performance. 
 
 After the initial characterization of normal system behavior and baseline 
performance has been conducted, the performance of the benchmark under indirect and 
direct memory analysis modes is compared.  A box plot of the performance results is 
shown in Figure 34 and ANOVA analysis is shown in Table 10.  Each performance 
measurement is grouped by benchmark subtest copy, scale, add and triad as well as the 
average of the four subtests.  These box plots reveal outliers for some of the data sets.  
After further investigation, removing these outliers does not affect the outcomes from the 
data; therefore they are retained.  This convention is used throughout the remainder of 
INTmem 
Subtest
Memory 
Analysis 
Mode
Mean 
(MB/s)
StDev 
(MB/s)
Est Difference 
(MB/s)
[Baseline - X]
P-Value
[Diff = 0]
Decrease in 
Performance
P-Value Ind vs Dir
∆ Performance
[Diff = 0]
Baseline 2503.6 20.5 - - - -
Indirect 2406.1 18 97.5 0 3.89%
Direct 2403.3 14.3 100.31 0 4.01%
Baseline 2477.3 15.9 - - - -
Indirect 2381.8 17.4 95.5 0 3.86%
Direct 2373.9 17.9 103.41 0 4.17%
Baseline 2879.1 11.6 - - - -
Indirect 2765.7 20.3 113.41 0 3.94%
Direct 2762 19.1 117.14 0 4.07%
Baseline 2864 9.7 - - - -
Indirect 2755.5 20.2 108.46 0 3.79%
Direct 2751.5 17.5 112.41 0 3.93%
Baseline 2681 8.9 - - - -
Indirect 2577.3 10.8 103.72 0 3.87%
Direct 2572.7 9.1 108.32 0 4.04%
0.205
0.163
0.002
Copy
0.247
0.003
Add
Triad
Average
Scale
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Chapter 5.  Outliers that are significant to the outcome from the data are explained and 
handled accordingly.   
 An initial look at the box plot reveals that for both indirect and direct analysis 
modes, the data transfer rate is reduced compared to the baseline.  In addition, the 
magnitude of the reduction in performance of the direct mode appears to be similar or 
slightly lower than that of the indirect mode.  Further ANOVA analysis, as shown in 
Table 10, reveals that these conclusions are accurate. 
 For each memory analysis mode, the mean and standard deviation is calculated 
for each INTmem subtest.  Within each subtest the sets of performance data are then 
compared.  The estimate of the difference between the baseline and the indirect or direct 
memory analysis modes are calculated.  The column labeled “Decrease in Performance” 
in Table 10 shows that while CMAT-V is running (indirect or direct mode) the decrease 
in performance ranges from 3.86% to 4.17%.  This supports the expected conclusion that 
executing CMAT-V impacts VM benchmark performance.  
 The next step in the analysis is to attempt to determine if there is a significant 
difference in the decrease in performance between indirect and direct modes.  If such a 
significant difference exists, it is possible that this could be attributed to the live-memory 
introspection, suggesting that it is detectable by the VM itself.  The estimated difference 
compared to the baseline between indirect and direct modes varies from 2.81 to 7.91 
MB/s.  To more accurately quantify the difference, or lack thereof, the mean baseline for 
each subtest is used to calculate the change in performance for each run conducted.  This 
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calculation assumes a constant baseline for comparison purposes.  The calculation of the 
difference in performance for each subtest is shown in (1) and (2). 
   , , …  ! ∆#, ∆#, . .  ∆#   (1)  
   %, %, …% ! ∆&, ∆&, . .  ∆&  (2)  
 The variable µB is the mean baseline performance for the subtest, I is the 
performance with indirect mode and D is the performance in direct mode for each run n.  
The change in performance results is calculated for both indirect and direct memory 
analysis modes represented as ∆# and ∆& respectively.   
 As a simple example, consider the case where a copy subtest baseline mean is  
µB = 2300 MB/s.  Further consider the case where the data set from the indirect 
benchmark results for the copy subtest was I = {2200, 2150, 2253, 2215, 2126} MB/s; for 
the direct benchmark results D = {2290, 2157, 2200, 2101, 2036} MB/s. To calculate the 
change in performance for each memory analysis mode, calculations would be made for 
the indirect mode as shown in 3-6. 
 ∆#! ∆#, ∆#, ∆#', ∆#(, ∆#)  (3)  
 ! *  +, *  +, *  '+, *  (+, *  )+  (4)  
 
! *2300  2200+, *2300  2150+, *2300  2235+, 
*2300  2215+, *2300  2126+  
(5)  
 ! 100, 150, 47, 85, 174  (6)  
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Similarly, calculations are made for direct mode as shown in 7-10. 
 ∆&! ∆&, ∆&, ∆&', ∆&(, ∆&)  (7)  
 ! *  %+, *  %+, *  %'+, *  %(+, *  %)+  (8)  
 
! *2300  2290+, *2300  2157+, *2300  2200+, 
*2300  2101+, *2300  2036+  
(9)  
 ! 10, 143, 100, 99, 264  (10)  
 
Now that both as ∆# and ∆& have been calculated, ANOVA testing is be used to compare 
these two data sets.  Using a two-sample t-test reveals that the P-value is 0.808 which 
means there is an 80.8% probability that the sample population means are not statistically 
different. 
 Using the data from the experiment, a similar ANOVA test is conducted for each 
subtest to determine whether or not there is a significant difference in the change in 
performance.  The results of this analysis are shown in the far right column in Table 10.  
By convention, any P-value above 0.1 when testing for a difference of zero suggests that 
the sample populations are not statistically different.  As such, the results indicate that the 
scale and average subtests are statistically different while the copy, add and triad subtests 
are not statistically different.  However, the change in system state over time must now 
be considered.  The change in performance observed between memory analysis modes 
(2.81 to 7.91 MB/s) is within the same magnitude as the variation in baseline 
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performance measured over the course of the experiment (2.85 to 7.89 MB/s).  As a 
consequence, it is highly likely that the difference in memory analysis mode performance 
is heavily influenced by change in system state.  This means that changes in performance 
strictly due to alternating memory analysis modes could be masked or do not exist.  In 
summary, when taking changes in baseline performance in account, the data does not 
reveal any statistically significant differences in performance between indirect and direct 
analysis modes. 
4.2.2. FLOATmem Performance 
 Similar to Section 4.2.1, the first step in analyzing the performance of the 
FLOATmem benchmark is to ensure that the data collected reflects normal system 
behavior.  The results for the 350 runs completed are shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35.  VM Analysis: FLOATmem Scatter Plot of Average. 
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Similar to the INTmem analysis, these results show that the first several runs of each set 
encounter distinctively high data transfer rates.  This initial spike in performance could 
likely be caused by the time delay for the Xen load balancing routines to evaluate and 
balance the workload.  As such, the first 10 runs of each set are not considered in later 
analysis. 
 Another anomaly in this data set occurs during runs 116 to 122 while testing in 
indirect memory analysis mode.  During these runs there is a distinct increase in data 
transfer rate.  Further investigation reveals that, on occasion, when CMAT-V is retrieving 
data from the Microsoft symbol server, the request to the server times out.  During this 
time, CMAT-V halts further execution as and waits for a response from Microsoft.  
While CMAT-V is halted, Xen detects this reduction in resource requirements and 
reallocates them to other processes, namely the VM running the benchmark.  It is no 
surprise then, that when CMAT-V is halted the benchmark performance is similar to that 
of the baseline measurements which are taken without CMAT-V executing.  This stall in 
CMAT-V execution is an uncommon occurrence and not representative of typical 
CMAT-V behavior.  As a result, runs 116 to 122 are also not considered in later analysis. 
 Next, the baseline performance sets are compared to determine if any factors 
affect the system state over time.  A baseline is run before the indirect mode testing, 
between tests and after the direct mode testing.  If any significant increases or decreases 
in baseline performance over time exist compared to the modes under test, the effects of 
the variations must be taken into account.  ANOVA statistics and box plot of the three 
baselines are shown in Table 11 and Figure 36.   
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Table 11.  ANOVA Results for VM FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 
Figure 36.  Box Plot of VM FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 The ANOVA test reveals that the there is no difference observed between the first 
and the third (P-value = 0.903) baseline sets while a moderate difference is observed 
between the first and third sets and the second intermediate baseline set (P-value = 0.04 
and 0.056).  This is similar to the trend observed during the INTmem test in Section 
4.2.1, where the intermediate baseline test performed significantly lower than the other 
two.  With this test however, the estimated difference in baseline sets range from 0.17 to 
Baseline Test 1 2 3 1 = Before Indirect Test
Mean 2743.62 2740.04 2743.45 2 = Intermediate
StDev 5.78 9.12 6.37 3 = After Direct Test
Tests Compared 1-2 1-3 2-3
P-Value [Diff = 0] 0.04 0.903 0.056
Est. Difference 
[First - Second] 3.58 0.17 -3.41
Percent Change 0.13% 0.01% -0.12%
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3.58 MB/s which is significantly less than in the previous section.  Again, it is possible 
that over time a slight decrease in baseline performance could exist.  Though the 
characterization of this trend would require further testing, the data provided indicates 
that an inherent variation exists independent of the memory analysis mode.  This 
variation must be taken into account during subsequent performance evaluation. 
 After the initial characterization of normal system behavior and baseline 
performance has been conducted, the performance of the benchmark under indirect and 
direct memory analysis modes is compared.  As shown in the box plot in Figure 37, it is 
apparent that during both indirect and direct analysis mode, a significant decrease in 
benchmark performance exists. 
 
Figure 37.  Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on VM FLOATmem Performance. 
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To further quantify the difference between indirect and direct performance, ANOVA tests 
are conducted and the results are shown in Table 12.  
Table 12.  ANOVA of CMAT-V Impact on VM FLOATmem Performance. 
 
 
For each memory analysis mode, the mean and standard deviation is calculated for each 
FLOATmem subtest.  Within each subtest the sets of performance data are then 
compared.  The estimate of the difference between the baseline and the indirect or direct 
memory analysis modes are calculated.  The decrease in performance while CMAT-V is 
running (indirect or direct mode) ranges from 81.84 to 101.8 MB/s which equates to 
3.19% to 3.46%.  This supports the expected conclusion that the benchmark performance 
running CMAT-V significantly impacts VM system performance.   
INTmem 
Subtest
Memory 
Analysis 
Mode
Mean 
(MB/s)
StDev 
(MB/s)
Est Difference 
(MB/s)
[Baseline - X]
P-Value
[Diff = 0]
Decrease in 
Performance
P-Value Ind vs Dir
∆ Performance
[Diff = 0]
Baseline 2564.2 18.8 - - - -
Indirect 2482.4 19.9 81.84 0 3.19%
Direct 2478.8 26.1 85.47 0 3.33%
Baseline 2557.1 12.9 - - - -
Indirect 2474.7 22.6 82.44 0 3.22%
Direct 2470.2 17.7 86.9 0 3.40%
Baseline 2925.8 10.7 - - - -
Indirect 2827.2 21.7 98.59 0 3.37%
Direct 2826.6 24.0 99.27 0 3.39%
Baseline 2922.3 10.7 - - - -
Indirect 2821.2 20.9 101.8 0 3.46%
Direct 2822.5 21.3 99.82 0 3.42%
Baseline 2742.4 7.4 - - - -
Indirect 2651.4 9.0 90.99 0 3.32%
Direct 2649.5 11.7 92.87 0 3.39%
Add
0.844
Triad
0.693
Average
0.235
Copy
0.302
Scale
0.150
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Furthermore, when observing the estimated difference compared to the baseline, for each 
subtest the difference between indirect and direct modes varies from 0.68 to 4.46 MB/s 
(99.27 - 98.59 and 86.9 - 82.44 respectively).  To more accurately quantify the difference, 
or lack thereof, the mean baseline for each subtest is used to calculate the change in 
performance for each run conducted.  This calculation assumes a constant baseline for 
comparison purposes.  The calculation of the difference in performance for each subtest 
is the same as described in Section 4.2.1 and with (1) and (2).  The results indicate that 
for all subtests the performance of indirect and direct modes are not statistically different.  
Furthermore, change in performance observed between memory analysis modes is within 
the same magnitude as the variation in baseline performance measured over the course of 
the experiment (0.17 to 3.58 MB/s).  It is highly likely that the any observed difference in 
performance is heavily influenced by unidentified changes in system state.  This means 
that changes in performance strictly due to alternating memory analysis modes could be 
masked or do not exist.  In summary, a difference in memory analysis modes is not 
observed within the VM for the FLOATmem benchmark. 
4.2.3. Conclusion 
 For all tests the chosen number of runs were sufficient to draw accurate 
conclusions about the data; therefore, no additional runs were conducted.  Within the VM 
itself, a decrease of approximately 3% to 4.5% was observed by executing CMAT-V 
within the Dom0 HM-API.  In order to completely isolate changes caused by CMAT-V’s 
live-memory analysis one must ensure that they have a baseline to compare to that does 
not change over time as the system changes.  Achieving these conditions however is very 
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difficult, if not improbable, to achieve for any system with real-life workloads.  Even if 
these conditions are met, the existence of VM interference unique to CMAT-V live 
analysis remains inconclusive.  However, if the system state changes over time are taken 
into account, the data collected under the experimental conditions described in this 
research support the hypothesis that direct analysis does not uniquely interfere with VM 
performance.  Therefore, when under realistic workloads, the accurate detection of 
unique interference caused by direct CMAT-V introspection is predicted as highly 
unlikely.  Finally, CMAT-V was able to accommodate all memory analysis modes.  This 
demonstrates that CMAT-V can scan two different simultaneously running VMs. 
4.3. Host System Performance 
 This section contains the results from the performance tests to measure the 
overhead of running CMAT-V on the HM-API.  Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 describe the 
results from the INTmem, FLOATmem and FFmpeg benchmarks respectively.  Section 
4.3.4 contains concluding remarks based on the results. 
4.3.1. INTmem Benchmark 
 It is first important to note that for this series of tests, there was no abnormal 
behavior of interest such that any runs were required to be removed from later analysis.  
The performance during the entire experiment is shown in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38.  Scatter Plot of Host INTmem Average Performance. 
 
 
Baseline measurements are made both before and after running the INTmem benchmark.  
The results of these measurements are shown in Table 13 and Figure 39.  These results 
show that there is a statistical difference in the baselines measured before and after the 
test (P-value = 0).  The estimate of the difference between the sample populations is 
approximately 21.58 MB/s.  This indicates that any calculated increase or decrease in 
performance calculated using compiled baseline data will have an associated error of 
approximately +/- 10.79 MB/s. 
Table 13.  ANOVA Results for Host INTmem Average Baseline Performance. 
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Figure 39.  Box Plot of Host INTmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 
The relevance of this difference in baseline in regards to the experiment being conducted 
is determined after analyzing CMAT-V performance results.  If the difference in baseline 
performance is significantly lower in magnitude than the performance difference running 
CMAT-V, this trend could be considered negligible. 
 A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct 
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 40.  As expected, it appears there is a significant 
decrease in benchmark performance while CMAT-V is executing.  Further analysis to 
quantify this decrease in performance is shown in Table 14. 
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Figure 40.  Box plot of CMAT-V Impact on Host INTmem Performance. 
  
Table 14.  ANOVA of Host INTmem Performance. 
 
 The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown in rows 3 and 4 of 
Table 14.  As shown in row 6, the samples for the baseline and direct mode 
measurements are statistically different for each INTmem subtest (P-value = 0).  
Furthermore, for each INTmem subtest, a decrease of approximately 9.51% to 10.20% is 
observed.  These performance results have an approximate error of 0.34% to 0.40% due 
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INTmem Subtest
Memory Analysis Mode Baseline Direct Baseline Direct Baseline Direct Baseline Direct Baseline Direct
Mean (MB/s) 2713.1 2455.1 2704.7 2428.7 3212.9 2894.2 3212.3 2894.7 2960.7 2668.2
StDev (MB/s) 16.5 64.6 16.8 58.4 32.3 67.6 44.8 69.6 21.7 21.2
Est Difference (MB/s)   
[Baseline - CMAT-V]
P-Value [Diff = 0]
Decrease in Performance
Error (+/-) 0.40% 0.40% 0.34% 0.34% 0.36%
0 0
Copy Scale Add Triad Average
9.51% 10.20% 9.92% 9.89%
0 0
9.88%
257.96 275.96 318.68 317.62 292.55
0
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to variations in baseline measurements calculated previously.  Because the error due to 
baseline variation is less than 0.5% these errors are considered negligible. 
4.3.2. FLOATmem Benchmark 
 Similar to Section 4.3.1, there was no abnormal behavior of interest such that any 
outliers needed to be removed for later analysis. 
 
Figure 41.  Scatter Plot of Host FLOATmem Average Performance. 
 
The performance during the entire experiment is shown in Figure 41.  Baseline 
measurements are made both before and after running the FLOATmem benchmark.  The 
results of these measurements are shown in Table 15 and Figure 42.   
Table 15.  ANOVA Results for Host FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance. 
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Figure 42.  Box Plot of Host FLOATmem Average Baseline Performance. 
 
 The results in Table 15 show that there is a statistical difference in the baselines 
measured before and after the test (P-value = 0.015 < 0.1).  The estimate of the difference 
between the sample populations is approximately 8.47 MB/s.  This indicates that any 
calculated increase or decrease in performance calculated using compiled baseline data 
will have an associated error of approximately +/- 4.24 MB/s.  The relevance of this 
difference in baseline in regards to the experiment being conducted is determined after 
analyzing CMAT-V performance results.  If the difference in baseline performance is 
significantly lower in magnitude than the performance difference running CMAT-V, this 
trend could be considered negligible. 
 A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct 
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 43.  As expected, it appears there is a significant 
decrease in benchmark performance while CMAT-V is executing. 
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Figure 43.  Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on Host FLOATmem Performance. 
 
 
Further analysis to quantify this decrease in performance is shown in Table 16. 
Table 16.  ANOVA of Host FLOATmem Performance. 
 
The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown.  As suspected, the 
samples for the baseline and direct mode measurements are statistically different for each 
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FLOATmem subtest (P-value = 0).  Furthermore, for each FLAOTmem subtest, a 
decrease of approximately 8.81% to 9.46% is observed.  These performance results have 
an approximate error of 0.13% to 0.16% due to variations in baseline measurements 
calculated previously.  Because the error due to baseline variation is less than 0.5% these 
errors are considered negligible. 
4.3.3. FFmpeg Benchmark 
 The performance of the FFmpeg benchmark over the course of the experiment is 
shown in Figure 44.   
 
Figure 44.  Scatter Plot of Host FFmpeg Performance. 
 
 Recall, the metric for this benchmark is the number of seconds it takes for the 
benchmark to complete.  Therefore, higher values indicate a decrease in performance.  
The first two baseline runs show a mildly uncharacteristic decrease in performance.  The 
28.5
29
29.5
30
30.5
31
31.5
32
32.5
33
33.5
0 50 100 150 200 250
S
e
co
n
d
s
Run Number
Baseline
Direct
109 
 
first baseline set quickly reaches a steady state while all remaining sets show no abnormal 
behavior.  Because these outliers are rare and limited in overall impact, they do not affect 
any outcomes.  As such, they are included in the benchmark data for later analysis. 
 Baseline measurements are made both before and after running the FFmpeg 
benchmark.  The results of these measurements are shown in Table 17 and Figure 45.   
Table 17.  ANOVA Results for Host FFmpeg Baseline Performance. 
 
 
Figure 45.  Box Plot of Host FFmpeg Baseline Performance. 
 
 The results in Table 17 show that there is not a statistical difference in the 
baselines measured before and after the test (P-value = 0.342 > 0.1).  This means that 
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intermediate execution of CMAT-V did not significantly affect the performance of the 
baseline measurements.  This is likely different from previous RAMspeed tests because 
FFmpeg is not designed with specific sensitivity towards memory performance.  Because 
the baseline sets are not different, this indicates limited change in system state over time 
which better isolates the cause of performance variation when changing memory analysis 
modes. 
A comparison of the host performance results between the baseline and direct 
modes is shown in the box plot in Figure 46.   
 
 
Figure 46.  Boxplot of CMAT-V Impact on Host FFmpeg Performance. 
 
As expected, it appears there is a significant decrease in benchmark performance while 
CMAT-V is executing.  Further analysis to quantify this decrease in performance is 
shown in Table 18.   
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Table 18.  ANOVA of Host FFmpeg Performance. 
 
 
The mean and standard deviation for each set of runs is shown.  The samples for the 
baseline and direct mode measurements are statistically different (P-value = 0).  
Furthermore, a decrease of approximately 11.98% is observed.   
4.3.4. Conclusion 
 For all tests the chosen number of runs were sufficient to draw accurate 
conclusions about the data; therefore, no additional runs were conducted.   In summary, 
an 8% to 12% decrease in performance was observed while running CMAT-V within the 
Dom0 HM-API.  For the RAMspeed benchmarks, variations in the baseline 
measurements were also observed, but were determined as negligible. 
 
  
Memory Analysis Mode Baseline Direct
Mean (s) 29.098 32.583
StDev (s) 16.5 64.6
Est Difference (s)                
[Baseline - CMAT-V]
P-Value [Diff = 0]
Decrease in Performance
-3.4852
0
11.98%
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V. Conclusions 
 This chapter provides a summary of key findings of this research.  Section 5.1 
contains an executive summary of the results.  Section 5.2 gives recommendations for 
future follow-on research. 
5.1. Executive Summary 
 The following sections describe how each goal of the research effort was met, 
summarizes the experimental results and draws final conclusions based on the data. 
5.1.1. Create a VMI Prototype 
 The first goal identified was to create a prototype VMI tool that accesses live VM 
memory, detect the OS executing in the VM and extract system state information.    This 
objective was achieved by developing CMAT-V, which utilizes CMAT, XenAccess and 
Xen APIs.  During experimental testing, strategic system state information was 
successfully extracted from two live VM’s.  This information includes kernel base 
address, active process lists, open network ports, registry keys, and system files and 
directories.  CMAT-V uses out-of-bound view generation.  Recall from Section 2.2 that 
this is formally described as shown below. 
   	   
CMAT-V uses software architecture information µ  to create a view Vext of the system 
state Sext observed from the VMM or hypervisor level.  Furthermore, the information in 
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Table 19 can be added to the VMI utilities summary shown in Table 2 of Section 2.3 to 
include CMAT-V. 
Table 19. CMAT-V Application Summary. 
Name VMM(s) Tested 
OS(s) 
Tested VMI Pattern Description Limitations 
CMAT-V Xen Windows Out-of- Band 
Detects OS and uses 
semantic information 
downloaded from 
Microsoft Symbol 
Server. Reports active 
processes, users, 
network activity, registry 
information. 
Depends on 
Microsoft semantics 
and the availability 
of the Microsoft 
Symbol Server.  
 
Changing system 
state during scan. 
 
For Windows XP operating systems, CMAT-V is binding.  In other words, because 
CMAT-V detects the Windows version, malware cannot leverage vulnerabilities 
introduced with new patches and updates. 
 The success of the CMAT-V prototype shows that VMI can be conducted on 
Windows-based VMs using static memory analysis techniques.  These techniques do not 
require a priori OS semantic information and do not interfere with VM operation by using 
pausing techniques.  One limitation to this approach, however, is that the system state of 
the VM itself can change during the course of the CMAT-V memory scan.  Any changes 
that occur between when the scan starts and completes are not guaranteed to be reflected 
in the results reported by CMAT-V.  If a history record of system state data is kept, 
however, CMAT-V is ideal for continual scanning over time without stalling the VM. 
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5.1.2. Verify Live Analysis Under Cyber Attack 
 The second goal was to verify live analysis functionality while under cyber attack.  
Four cyber attack scenarios were run to determine CMAT-V’s ability to provide evidence 
of the threat.  These scenarios focused on rootkit-class malware which are known for 
hiding information.  For all four scenarios, while the VM itself often reported no 
evidence of compromise, CMAT-V was successful in providing one or more 
distinguishing characteristics of the existence of the threat.  This confirms that sensors 
which leverage the hypervisor’s privileged position can provide uncompromised 
situational awareness information for network defense operators. 
5.1.3. Evaluate the Detectability of VM Memory Latency 
 This set of experiments focused on VMI performance within the VM itself.  These 
tests revealed a 3% to 4.5% decrease in VM benchmark performance when executing 
CMAT-V within the Dom0 HM-API.  Furthermore, under the experimental conditions 
described, the data was not able to confirm VM detection of the presence of CMAT-V’s 
live memory analysis.  If a stable system state can be maintained throughout all baseline 
benchmarks, it is possible that a detectable presence of CMAT-V could be seen.  
However, establishing a consistent baseline with memory sensitive benchmarks could 
prove difficult because they are particularly sensitive to varying user workloads over 
time.  Unless this challenge is overcome, detection of CMAT-V is highly unlikely. 
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5.1.4. Verify Multi-VM Live Analysis 
 Another goal was to demonstrate that two different VMs executing 
simultaneously could be analyzed to show that the prototype is not limited to one VM at a 
time, but can support multiple active VMs.  This was demonstrated by using CMAT-V in 
both indirect and direct memory analysis modes.  In each mode, two VMs are 
simultaneously executing.  By successfully implementing these modes, this research 
demonstrated that CMAT-V could conduct live analysis on both of the VMs. 
5.1.5. Measure System Overhead 
 The final goal was to evaluate system overhead.   This set of experiments 
focused on the impact of CMAT-V on the host system.  The results from these 
experiments, which used three different benchmarks, revealed an 8% to 12% decrease in 
performance if CMAT-V is executing within the Dom0 HM-API.  The significance of 
this decrease in performance will depend on the user’s allowable threshold for the desired 
application. 
5.2.  Future Work 
 The following sections contain suggestions for future work.  These suggestions 
include evaluation and enhancements to the edition of CMAT-V used in this research. 
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5.2.1. Thread List Introspection 
 CMAT and CMAT-V currently scan the EPROCESS linked list to identify 
discrepancies between what CMAT detects and what the target system reports.  A similar 
approach could be used for the executive thread (ETHREAD) block that contains thread 
information for a given process [Rus09].  Each ETHREAD block contains a pointer back 
to the parent EPROCESS block.  While EPROCESS blocks can be unlinked and hidden 
from the OS, the process threads must execute on the CPU, therefore their existence is 
known.   Future work should involve displaying running threads for each process.  In 
addition, cross validation can be conducted by detecting threads executing on the CPU 
that point to a parent process not in the EPROCESS block. 
5.2.2. Response Time Analysis 
 In this study, tests were conducted to determine the interference of CMAT-V on 
the DomU guest as well as the overhead on the Dom0 HM-API.  Another important 
metric to consider is the amount of time it takes a user of CMAT-V to retrieve relevant 
system state information.  For example, if it takes CMAT-V too long to report the results, 
then it is likely that it will be impractical to use in the field.  In addition, the faster 
CMAT-V is able to report results, the less time is allowed for the system state itself to 
change while introspection is taking place.  Performance of CMAT-V should be 
evaluated by taking timing measurements and comparing the performance of CMAT-V to 
similar VMI applications.   
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5.2.3. Advanced Registry Search 
 Currently, CMAT-V only reports root-level registry key information for a 
particular process.  As discussed previously, rootkits use and often hide registry key 
information.  If the user were looking for a particular registry key, it would be valuable 
for CMAT-V to include a registry key search capability.  Similar programs such as Active 
Registry Monitor allow users to conduct searches for specific registry keys.  This search 
capability, however, might take a long time to execute.  This will need to be taken into 
consideration and optimized as appropriate. 
5.2.4. Driver Detection 
 Many rootkits rely on custom drivers in order to gain access to kernel level 
functions.  Adding the functionality for CMAT-V to detect system drivers would provide 
a more complete picture of the VM’s system state.  One possible detection method is to 
search for driver objects which represent an individual driver connected to a system 
process.  Process Explorer is an example of a program that lists the loaded drivers, their 
names, version information and load address [Rus09].  Similar techniques could be used 
to enhance CMAT-V functionality. 
5.2.5. IP Detection 
 Currently CMAT-V is able to report open port information.  Future CMAT-V 
development should focus on determining IP addresses of the open ports.  With this IP 
information, users will be able to determine where the connection is being made and if 
necessary, conduct appropriate counter measures. 
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5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 There is no silver bullet in the area of cyber defense.  The cyber domain requires a 
multi-faceted approach where network policies, firewalls, sensors, antivirus, etc. must all 
be leveraged to deliver synergistic effects.  As part of this “cyber-toolkit,” hypervisor-
based VMI provides an unparalleled strategic position to achieve cyber situational 
awareness.  This research, however, is just the tip of the iceberg.  There is a well of 
untapped potential in the area of hypervisor-based virtual machine introspection.  More 
research and development needs to be conducted to further this technology.  These 
sensors are essential to military network defense networks now and will be even more 
critical in the future. 
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Appendix A: Installing Cent OS 5 Using Xen Hypervisor 
A-1. Downloading CentOS 5& Making Installation Boot DVD 
1. Visit http://mirror.centos.org/centos/5/isos/ for Cent OS 5 download and select 
either i386 (for 32-bit) or x86_64 (for 64 bit).1 
2. Select a download location (ex.  http://mirrors.rit.edu/centos/5.4/isos/i386/). 
3. Download CentOS-5.4-i386-bin-DVD.iso (~3.7 GB). 
4. To ensure the ISO has been downloaded correctly, it may necessary to conduct a 
hash test of the ISO file.  To do this, execute the following in the terminal:     
md5sum [FILE] where [FILE] is the path to the file CentOS-5.4-i386-bin-
DVD.iso .  This will perform a checksum of the file to verify if there are any 
errors.  This will take a few minutes to complete.  Once the checksum is complete 
it returns a stream of hex numbers.  Take this checksum stream and check it with 
checksum in a txt file usually located at the same mirror site used in step 2 (e.g.,  
md5sum.txt).  If it does not match, try repeating the download (step 3) or change 
your mirror site (step 2). 
5. Burn ISO to a DVD using CD/DVD burning software (e.g.,  Disc Burner for 
Linux; IMG Burn for Windows). 
A-2. Installing CentOS 5 
1. Place ISO disk into drive and reboot the computer. 
                                                 
 
 
1
 Red Hat.  Index of /centos/5/isos.  Oct 14, 2009.  http://mirror.centos.org/centos/5/isos/ (accessed Nov 7, 2009). 
 2. Follow the on screen installation instructi
3. When prompted to select additional tasks for CentOS to support, click the 
Virtualization check box
dependencies (including libvirt, and virtual machine manager).
If you are installing Xen after CentOS has already been installed, see for 
installation instructions 
4. Continue following on screen installation instructions until CentOS instal
complete.  When prompted, the system will reboot
                                                
 
 
1
 HowtoForge.  Installing Xen On CentOS 5.0
Nov 9, 2009). 
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ons. 
.  This will install the Xen hypervisor as well as all 
 
http://www.howtoforge.com/centos_5.0_xen 
.   
 
.  Jun 8, 2007.  http://www.howtoforge.com/centos_5.0_xen (accessed 
 
1
. 
l is 
 5. Upon reboot you might see the Grand Unified Bood Loader (GRUB) menu to 
select which kernel you would like to boot with
identified by some version number followed by  
shows two different version examples. The version installed may or may not 
match those shown below. 
6. Once you have booted CentOS you can verify the current kernel being used by 
typing and executing   uname 
121 
.  Select the xen kernel
el5xen. The screenshot below 
 
-r   in the terminal. 
 
 which is 
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You should see the Xen kernel displayed.  You are now running in the 
paravirtualized Dom0 operating system.   
 
A-3. Switching to HAV Mode 
In order to enable full virtualization with use of HAV such as Intel-VT or AMD-
V.  It may be necessary to manually enable virtualization within the system BIOS.  This 
allows operating systems such as Windows to be installed as a fully virtualized guest in 
the Virtual Machine Manager without access to the OS source code.  Follow the 
following procedures to enable virtualization in the BIOS with the Dell Latitude D630 
laptop. 
1. Reboot the system. 
2. Upon reboot enter the BIOS setup by pressing the appropriate initiation key.  
For Dell Latitude D630, press the F2 key. 
3. Once in the BIOS setup use the arrow keys to expand the POST Behavior 
dropdown.  Under POST Behavior, arrow down to Virtualization settings. 
 Hit ENTER to modify the settings and change the setting to Enabled.
4. Hit ESC and select save settings and exit
configured to enable HAV
A-4. Installing Windows Using Xen HAV
The following procedure
machine using hardware assisted virtualization
completed CentOS 5 installation as described previously 
installation CD. 
1. Place the Windows XP installation CD/DVD in the CD/DVD
123 
.  At this point your PC is now 
.   
 
 guides you through creating a Windows XP virtual 
.  To complete this lab you must have 
and have a Win
-ROM drive.
 
 
dows XP 
 
 2. In CentOS 5 click on the 
Tools>Virtual Machine Manager
manager that guides you through 
3. In the virtual machine manager click on the local host with ID 
on   . 
4. VMM will then give you instructions on how to create a virtual machine
. 
5. In the virtual machine name dialog box type in Windows_
.   
6. Select the radio button for 
NOTE: If this selection is grayed out, see 
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Applications menu bar and go to 
.  This will launch the virtual machine 
creating a virtual machine. 
xen and then click 
XP_1
 
Fully Virtualized, then click 
Section A-3. 
System 
.  Click  
.  And click 
. 
 7. Check and make sure the 
selected.  Set the OS type to 
Windows XP x86.  Click   
125 
Local install media (ISO image or CDROM)
Windows and the OS Variant to 
. 
 
 is 
Microsoft 
 8. Click the radio button for 
your CD-ROM drive.  
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CD-ROM or DVD install and select device mount for 
Click   . 
 
 9. In the storage dialog box select the 
to install your image file (e.g.,
to be 10,000 MB to allocate 10
the Allocate entire virtual disk now 
 
10. In the Network setup dialog, make sure that the Virtual Network radio button is 
selected and the Network dropdown menu is set to 
127 
File (disk image) radio button and set the pat
  /var/lib/xen/images/Windows_XP_1).  
 GB of hard drive for your virtual machine
is checked.  Click               . 
 
 
default.  Click   
h 
Set the Size 
.  Ensure 
. 
 11. In the Memory and CPU Allocation dialog set Max Memory and Startup memory 
to 512 and set Virtual CPUs to 1
12. To finish the virtual machine creation and begin installation, click 
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.  Click   . 
 
 
. 
 13. This should launch your virtual machine and begin installation from your 
Windows XP disk.  
HINT: To return mouse 
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Follow the on screen instructions to begin installation
functionality to the host OS (CentOS 5) enter Ctrl + Alt.
 
.   
 
  
14. Once setup is complete your VM will shut down
following in your virtual machine manager window:
130 
.  You should now see the 
 
 
 
 
 To restart your computer double click Windows_XP_1 to bring up the VM 
window (if the window is not open already) then click 
VM and launch Windows XP.
 
15. Follow the on screen instructions to complete Windows XP installation.
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Run.  This will reboot your 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix B:
B-1. Preparing Your System
1. First, install CentOS 5 development tools
edit/compile the C program
Remove Software and select 
Apply.  This will download and install 
2. Close Package Manager
development tools by typing and executing “
3. Reopen Package Manager
server by searching for “svn” and checking the package starting with 
mod_dav_svn then click A
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.  These tools will allow you to 
.  In the CentOS 5 host, click Applications>Add 
Development.  Check Development Tools 
all packages.  [pic] 
 and then open up a shell terminal and install the xen 
yum install xen-devel
 open and install SVN server module for Subversion 
pply and Continue.   
and click 
 
” . 
 4. Search for “curl” in the Package Manager
installed; if not, select them and click Apply
connect to the Internet
5. Close Package Manager
and download the RPM for Linux (e
allow CMAT-V to extract Microsoft cabinet files.
6. Run the RPM and install the package
unable to verify the software, click Install Anyway
133 
.  Verify that curl and curl
.  Curl is used to allow CMAT
.   
.  Go to the cabextract website www.cabextract.org.uk
.g., Cabextract-1.2-1.i386.rpm)
 
.  If a message box appears stating it is 
.   
 
-devel are 
-V to 
 
 
.  This will 
 7. You are now ready to load and 
B-2. Compiling CMAT
1. Copy the file XA_CMAT_2_7.zip
contacting Dr.  Barry Mullins at 
2. Extract the zip file to a desired directory.
3. Open up a shell terminal
/…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess
“make install”.
4. Once this completes, in the same directory
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compile CMAT-V. 
-V v 2.7 
 to system.  All software is available by 
barry.mullins@afit.edu . 
 
.  Change to the directory 
.  Once in this directory type the command     
 
, execute “./configure
 
” . 
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5. Now change to the directory /…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess/xenaccess 
and execute the command “make” . 
B-3. Executing CMAT-V v 2.7 
Change to the directory /…/XA_CMAT_2_7/xenaccess/xenaccess/examples 
Once in this directory there are several modes of operation to choose from: 
./cmat [mode] [parameter]…[parameter] 
 
Static Analysis Mode:  ./cmat [file] 
This mode implements the legacy CMAT functionality.  In this mode a memory dump 
file must be provided. 
 
Live VM Mode: ./cmat –virt_live [VM ID#] 
This mode uses live VM memory to gather VM state information. 
 
VM Dump Mode: ./cmat –virt_dump [VM ID#] [output file] 
This mode takes a memory dump of the live VM, then conducts static analysis on the 
memory dump. 
 
VM Benchmark Mode: ./cmat –virt_live_bench [VM ID#] 
This mode is similar to Live VM mode except the program will immediately exit after 
data has been extracted by introspection.  This mode is used when running benchmarks.  
Using a bash script with CMAT-V execution in a for loop allows for uninterrupted 
execution. 
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Appendix C: Installing Phoronix Test Suite 
1) This describes the procedure to install the Phoronix Test Suite on CentOS5. 
From the terminal, switch to root and install Phoronix by typing the command 
>yum install phoronix-test-suite  
Alternatively you may download the suite and install it. 
 
2) You will also need to install PHP 5 CLI hypertext preprocessor by typing the 
command    >yum install php-cli 
Once installed, run Phoronix Test Suite to display available options by typing the 
command   >phoronix-test-suite 
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Appendix D: Downloading Software Utilities 
The following contains download locations for software utilities used in this 
research. 
 
Process Explorer 
 Process Explorer shows a list of the currently active processes, including the 
names of their owning accounts.  Additionally, if Process Explorer is in DLL mode, the 
DLLs and memory-mapped files that the process has loaded are visible.  Process Explorer 
also has a search capability that will show which processes have particular handles 
opened or DLLs loaded [Rus10]. 
Download Location: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896653.aspx 
 
Driver View 
“DriverView utility displays the list of all device drivers currently loaded on your 
system.  For each driver in the list, additional useful information is displayed: load 
address of the driver, description, version, product name, company that created the driver, 
and more” [Nir10]. 
Download Location: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/driverview.html 
 
InstDrv 
 GUI tool that allows a driver to be registered, started, stopped and removed. 
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Download Location: www.rootkit.com/vault/hoglund/InstDvr.zip 
NetCat for Windows 
“Netcat is a featured networking utility which reads and writes data across 
network connections, using the TCP/IP protocol” [Gia06]. 
Download Location: http://joncraton.org/blog/netcat-for-windows 
 
RegScanner 
“RegScanner is a small utility that allows you to scan the Registry, find the 
desired Registry values that match to the specified search criteria, and display them in 
one list.  After finding the Registry values, you can easily jump to the right value in 
RegEdit, simply by double-clicking the desired Registry item.  You can also export the 
found Registry values into a .reg file that can be used in RegEdit” [Nir10]. 
Download Location: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/regscanner.html 
 
Windows Driver Kit (WDK) 
 “The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) Version 7.1.0 is an update to the WDK 7.0.0 
release and contains the tools, code samples, documentation, compilers, headers and 
libraries with which software developers create drivers for Windows 7, Windows Vista, 
Windows XP, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 
2003.  This development kit does not contain device drivers for your personal computer.  
If you are looking for drivers for your personal computer, go to Microsoft Update for 
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downloads, or visit Windows Hardware Help for more information to find device drivers 
and hardware.  A working knowledge of C programming is necessary to use this kit to 
develop Windows drivers” [Mic10]. 
Download Location: http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/default.aspx  
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